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This paper extends previous work on the modal logic CK as a reference system, both
proof-theoretically and model-theoretically, for a correspondence theory of constructive
modal logics. First, the fundamental nature of CK is discussed and compared with the
intuitionistic modal logic IK which is traditionally taken to be the base line. Then, it is
shown, that CK admits of a cut-free Gentzen sequent calculus G-CK which has (i) a local
interpretation in constructive Kripke models and (ii) does not require explicit world labels.
Finally, the paper demonstrates how non-classical modal logics such as IK, CS4, CL, or
Masini’s deontic system of 2-sequents arise as theories of CK, presented both as special
rules and as frame classes.
© 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Arguably one of the most intriguing modal theories, one which has created a world of its own, is intuitionistic logic. It
has ﬁrst been conceived (Glivenko, Kolmogorov, Heyting) as a formalisation of constructive reasoning rejecting the principle
of the Excluded Middle and was later identiﬁed (Gödel, Kripke) as a fragment of Lewis’ S4 modal system which strengthens
classical implication C → D by (hereditary) necessity C ⊃ D = (C → D) using an S4-type  modality. Intuitionistic logic
has widespread applications in the constructive foundations of Mathematics as well as in Computer Science where the close
connection between proofs and computations has set off a rich body of work on λ-calculi and type theories for programming
languages. These exploit the fundamental correspondence, known as the Curry–Howard Isomorphism, which permits us to
interpret proofs of constructive implications C ⊃ D as functional λ-programs computing values of type D from values of
type C . The simply-typed λ-calculus [1] which is isomorphic to the proof algebra of intuitionistic propositional logic (IPL)
is the archetypal example from which many powerful extensions have been generated such as System F or the Calculus of
Constructions.
Intuitionistic logic is an implicit modal theory encapsulating a notion of constructive proof and computation. It is natural
to add modal operators on top of it to capture further intensional aspects of computation. Indeed the study of intuitionistic
modal logic and speciﬁcally of modal type theories has attracted a lot of interest. The two most well-known modalised type
theories are variations of computational type theory which go back to the work of Moggi [2] and variations of modal type
theory initiated by Kobayashi [3], Pfenning & Wong [4] and Bierman & De Paiva [5].
Without Excluded Middle and the classical double negation duality we are looking at independent  and  modalities
which may or may not have related interpretations. Deﬁning axioms for one operator does not necessarily determine the
properties of the other. While the necessity modalities are well understood, matters are not so clear cut regarding the
possibility modality. Indeed, there seems to be a basic divide between intuitionistic modal logics and modal type theories
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the following we discuss the issue and then pin down the contribution of this paper.
1.1. Intuitionistic K versus constructive K
The traditional approach in intuitionistic modal logics is to dualise the standard algebraic characterisation of  as a
monotonic ∧-preserving operator of intuitionistic propositional logic (IPL) and to deﬁne  as a monotonic ∨-preserving
modality. There are two equivalent axiomatisations of this idea, Plotkin and Stirling’s IK [6,7] and Fischer-Servi’s system [8],
called FS in [9]:
Axioms (IK)
All theorems of IPL
IK1: (A ⊃ B) ⊃ (A ⊃B)
IK2: (A ⊃ B) ⊃ (A ⊃B)
IK3: ¬⊥
IK4: (A ∨ B) ⊃ (A ∨B)
IK5: (A ⊃B) ⊃(A ⊃ B)
Rules
MP: A and A ⊃ B implies B
Nec: A implies A
Axioms (FS)
All theorems of IPL
FS1: 
FS2: (A ∧ B) ≡ (A ∧B)
FS3: ¬⊥
FS4: (A ∨ B) ≡ (A ∨B)
FS5: (A ⊃B) ⊃(A ⊃ B)
FS6: (A ⊃ B) ⊃ (A ⊃B)
Rules
MP: A and A ⊃ B implies B
Reg: A ⊃ B implies A ⊃B and A ⊃B
Like classical K, the logic IK/FS admits of an elementary Kripke style model theory and various extensions, such as IS4,
IS4.3, IS5, may be rendered in terms of characteristic frame classes [6]. The system IK/FS arises from the standard intu-
itionistic semantics of the propositional connectives and the interpretation of ,  as universal and existential quantiﬁers
over accessible worlds in an intuitionistic meta-theory:
x |
C iff ∀y.x y ⇒ ∀z.y R z ⇒ z |
 C (1)
x |
C iff ∃z.x R z & z |
 C (2)
where R is the modal accessibility relation and  a reﬂexive and transitive reﬁnement relation capturing a notion of partial
information increase. In intuitionistic logic all propositions must be closed under reﬁnement, i.e., x |
 C and x y implies
y |
 C . For this to hold under deﬁnition (2) of , the models of IK/FS need to satisfy conﬂuence between  and R , i.e., the
frame condition −1 ; R ⊆ R ;−1 where ; denotes composition of relations. Many results on these intuitionistic variants of
normal modal logics may be derived from the fact that they can be embedded into the classical two-dimensional modal logic
S4 ⊗ K [9].
However, there is something odd about the “normal” interpretation. First, it is unsatisfactory that the Kripke semantics
for the basic system should already require a frame condition connecting the modal and intuitionistic dimensions. The
semantics given in [9] even reduces (1) back to the classical condition x |
C iff ∀z.y R z ⇒ z |
 C in favour of introducing
yet another frame condition,  ; R ⊆ R ;. Such frame conditions indicate that we are not in a free and irredundant set-
theoretic representation. Instead, IK/FS looks more like a special theory relative to some more elementary class of models.
Furthermore, deﬁnition (2) is not only in need of a frame condition, it is also directly responsible for the axioms FS4/IK4
as well as FS5/IK5, which are not unproblematic from a constructive point of view.
First, take the axiom FS4/IK4 of Disjunctive Distribution, viz. (A ∨ B) ⊃ (A ∨B) generated by the conﬂuence frame
condition −1 ; R ⊆ R ;−1:
• Although conﬂuence is natural for monotonic accessibility functions R , it is not for accessibility relations. Suppose R
models a non-deterministic choice arising from partiality of information: For some computational object or state x there
may be two options of successors x R y1 and x R y2 which are undecided because of lack of information about x. After
reﬁning x to x′ by additional information, i.e., x x′ , this information deﬁcit might be resolved so that the option x′ R y1
is no longer applicable. In this case, we may not even have x′ R y′1 for any reﬁnement of y′1  y1, as the conﬂuence of
R and  would require.
• Suppose C means “in some context C”. We may well be able to construct a proof which is guaranteed to decide A ∨ B
“in some context” but this does not mean we can construct a proof of A ∨B which would have to decide outright
whether A or B holds, i.e., whether “in some context” A or “in some context” B is true. This is problematic if the
decision between A and B in (A ∨ B) depends on the contextual circumstances. If contextual reasoning involves
expending computational resources then the decision A ∨ B can only be constructed by actually entering the context
and thus cannot be anticipated.
• If  reads “true in classical logic” it would certainly be constructive to assume (A ∨ ¬A) but not A ∨¬A. Or take to mean “under normal circumstances”: It would seem easy to maintain constructively that (I’ll show up at 7am ∨
I’ll call you) but rather diﬃcult to decide whether  I’ll show up at 7am or  I’ll call you is true.
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not satisfy Disjunctive Distribution. Presumably the ﬁrst to explicitly argue this case was Wijesekera [12,13] who observed
that the natural interpretation of  in constructive concurrent dynamic logic (CCDL) does not satisfy FS4/IK4. The same
applies to the Beth–Kripke–Joyal cover semantics of modalities [14] which implement a notion of local truth familiar from
topos theory. The lack of distribution is typical for modal type theories, speciﬁcally modal logics under the judgemental
reconstruction of Pfenning [15,16].
Similar problems arise in the interaction between  and  exhibited by scheme IK5/FS5 which stems from the semantic
clause (2). The following examples suggest there may not be a universal computational justiﬁcation for the implication
(A ⊃B) ⊃(A ⊃ B).
• Again read C generically as “in some context C” and C as “in all contexts C”. The precondition A ⊃B amounts to
a construction that gives a proof of B in all contexts under the assumption that A holds in some context. This does not
universally warrant the conclusion (A ⊃ B) that in all contexts the assumption A would entail B . Say, if we take “con-
text” to mean “accessible economic context”. We might be able to realise the statement “(ﬁnancial funds are available) ⊃(humanitarian aid can be provided)” because in the current economic context we have a strategy to convert money
from some accessible business context into food that can be used for humanitarian aid in all economic contexts, where
needed. However, it is not guaranteed that in all accessible economic contexts where ﬁnancial funds are available we
could also provide humanitarian aid. For instance, under the conditions of the local context money cannot buy food if
there is no-one who sells it.
• Let us take an interpretation from programming, related to CCDL and the realisability model of Kobayashi [3]: The
possibility C might be the statement that some execution of process p yields a value of type C and C means all
executions of p generate a value of type C . Additionally we stipulate that a constructive proof of C or C must
guarantee that these statements are based on static information available about p and do not depend on possible
further reﬁnement of the program code p (e.g., instantiation of run-time parameters, calibrations, etc.). It may happen
that p, in some run-time context, generates A but not B . Then, (A ⊃ B) is false. At the same time there may be some
other instantiation in which none of its executions generate A. Hence, A is false as well. But then A ⊃B is trivially
true. This contradicts validity of IK5/FS5 which would require (A ⊃ B) to be provable.
• Nanevski [17] presents a modal lambda calculus where modality SC speciﬁes suspended expressions which read from
a dynamic store S to produce values of type C while SC types expressions that ﬁrst destructively update the global
store and then produce a value of type C in the updated store. In this system the evaluation of an expression of typeS (A ⊃ B) may depend on dynamic store but the resulting function of type A ⊃ B must be pure. Such a pure function
from input A to output B cannot be produced from an expression of type S A ⊃S B since the latter only provides a
result of type S B which is a suspended value of type B depending on the store rather than a pure value of type B .
Finally, consider the axiom FS3/IK3. It is known that fallible worlds, in which all propositions become true, need to be
added to the intuitionistic Kripke models in order to admit of a constructive meta-theory [18]. Since IPL has no modalities
such fallible worlds have no inﬂuence on the class of theorems. With modalities, however, this is no longer the case as
fallible worlds may be accessible from non-fallible worlds through the modal relation R and so become ‘visible’ in the form
of ⊥ statements. Hence, with fallible worlds being present, the axiom FS3/IK3 is no longer valid. E.g., a proof/program
of type S⊥ may be a non-terminating process which locks up while updating the store S , which should not canonically
induce (through an axiom like FS3/IK3) a program of type ⊥ which locks up straight away.
It seems to us that in computational type theories [2,19,20] or modal type theories [3,16,17,21], where constructive
proofs turn into λ-programs, the schemes FS3/IK3–FS5/IK5 fail to have a uniform computational justiﬁcation. On the other
hand, the schemes that do appear to be computationally justiﬁed are FS1/IK1, FS2/IK2 and FS6. Restricting to these axioms
yields the constructive system known as CK [22,23] with the two equivalent presentations:
Axioms (CK-1)
All theorems of IPL
IK1: (A ⊃ B) ⊃ (A ⊃B)
IK2: (A ⊃ B) ⊃ (A ⊃B)
Rules
MP: A and A ⊃ B implies B
Nec: A implies A
Axioms (CK-2)
All theorems of IPL
FS1: 
FS2: (A ∧ B) ≡ (A ∧B)
FS6: (A ⊃ B) ⊃ (A ⊃B)
Rules
MP: A and A ⊃ B implies B
Reg: A ⊃ B implies A ⊃B and A ⊃B
CK is non-normal regarding  because of the lack of Disjunctive Distribution and thus the general techniques for stan-
dard intuitionistic modal logics (e.g., for IntK, [9, Chapter 10]) do not directly apply. Still, constructive modal logics
have adequate Kripke semantics [12,24,25,23] or topological semantics [26]. They are based on (1) for  and the stronger
interpretation of  given as
x |
C iff ∀y.x y ⇒ ∃z.y R z ∧ z |
 C (3)
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FS4/IK4 and FS5/IK5 which now turn into non-trivial frame properties generating proper extensions of CK. If we also add
fallible worlds then FS3/IK3 is removed as well (see [23]). Alternatively, as demonstrated in [27], from a proof-theoretic
perspective CK can be seen as a fragment of IK.
CK is well known [12] as a constructive modal logic where the modality is based on an accessibility relation between
partial states of information. For instance, in CCDL [13] the accessibility relation acts on partial information about a com-
plete machine state. CK is the natural modal structure of relational spaces, which are standard relational frames equipped
with topologies [26]. Also, as indicated above, CK modalities arise from local notions of truth [14].
Note that CK (without IK3/FS3) is not the intuitionistic analogue to classical K in the sense of Fischer-Servi and Simp-
son [7] since adding Excluded Middle C ∨ ¬C ≡  does not collapse the theory to give classical K. It is an open question
whether there exists a true analogue of K between CK and IK that is both constructively acceptable and returns classical
K under Excluded Middle. It may even be doubted that such a constructive analogue exists, since the classical collapse
criterion makes it impossible to give logical explanations for phenomena that are classically inconsistent but nevertheless
constructively consistent. In any case, CK should be a reasonable common base point from which a correspondence theory
for constructive modal logics can be attempted.
1.2. Towards a correspondence theory based on CK
Of course, all of the theories of IK/FS fall into the remits of a correspondence theory based on CK. Yet, there are theories
of CK, which are not at the same time extensions of IK:
• the propositional fragment of Wijesekera’s CCDL [12,13] or the logic of modal frames [26] which are CK plus the
IK3/FS3 axiom ¬⊥;
• the propositional fragment of Fitch’s M [28] which is CK plus the T -axioms C ⊃ C , C ⊃C ;
• Masini’s I-2SC theory [29] which is CK plus axiom ¬⊥ and the deontic scheme C ⊃C ;
• the S4-style modal type theory CS4 [3,16,25,14], which is CK plus the T -axioms C ⊃ C , C ⊃ C as well as the
4-axioms C ⊃C , C ⊃C ([3] also adds ¬⊥);
• Computational Logic (CL) [30,11], also known as propositional lax logic (PLL) [24,14], which extends CS4 by the axiom
C ⊃C . This collapses  and strengthens  to a modality equipped with the tensorial strength (C ∧D) ⊃(C ∧ D);
• the S5-style modal type theory Lambda 5 [31] which employs the modalities  and  to express mobile code for
distributed computations. The type system is developed as a judgemental sequent calculus following Martin-Löf’s [32]
notion of hypothetical judgements.
CK is a promising core system able to explain various constructive modal logics that have found applications in the
literature as specialised semantic theories deﬁned by frame classes. E.g., it is known how IK, CS4, PLL/CL arise from CK in
terms of Kripke models [25]. However, a systematic CK correspondence theory has not yet been attempted and so a rich
lattice of constructive modal theories still lies undiscovered.
The game is even more interesting than in the classical case: A satisfactory correspondence theory for constructive logic
will not only cover the extensional aspects. It should also address the computational aspects in the sense of building Curry–
Howard correspondences between proof systems and λ-calculi. In other words, a correspondence theory for CK should
not only relate theories and (Kripke) models but also logic and programming in the spirit of the propositions-as-types
and proofs-as-programs paradigm. Some systems of constructive modal logic have been successfully investigated in this
respect. Computational type theory [2,30], which links proofs in PLL/CL with terms in the computational λ-calculus, has
found many applications, e.g. to accommodate non-functional (“impure”) features [33], in strictness analysis and partial
evaluation [34,35] or for constraint extraction [19,20] just to name a few. PLL/CL is a specialised theory of CS4 which in
turn is the logic of modal type theory [3,16,21,5,4]. Modal type theories have found use to deal with higher-order abstract
syntax [36,37], meta-variables [38], staged computations [39,40], distributed computing [31], complexity theory [41] and
much more. Recently, Nanevski [17] (see also [21, Sec. 9.1]) has demonstrated the usefulness of combining CS4-style -
types for capturing destructive updates with -types for dynamic binding.
Outside of PLL/CL or CS4 the proof-theoretic treatment of constructive  and  and their computational interpretation
of modal proofs following the Curry–Howard Isomorphism (see, e.g. the discussion in [22]) is still largely unexplored. While seems well behaved,  poses problems.
Masini [29] presented a cut-free Gentzen system for CK + ¬⊥ + C ⊃ C but only proofs in the -fragment have
been turned into an associated λ-calculus [42]. Because of the deontic axiom C ⊃C , the -fragment of Masini’s system
generates an inﬁnity of -nested theorems of the form , ,  or (( ∧ ) ∧ ) or alternations, which form a profusion of proof constants stating the existence of implicit trees of worlds and functions on
worlds. Clearly, without universal collapse axioms, like those in CS4, such proof terms are diﬃcult to handle coherently in
a logical λ-calculus that has to satisfy Church–Rosser, subject reduction and strong normalisation.
Yet, what about CK proper? In CK there are no such oracle proofs for constructive  existence statements. Each proof
of  must be obtained by instantiating another hypothesis of form . For instance, any closed proof of a proposition C
already amounts to a closed proof of C and any closed proof of C ⊃D is essentially a closed proof of C ⊃ D together
M. Mendler, S. Scheele / Information and Computation 209 (2011) 1465–1490 1469with the identity function on contexts. Pure CK offers more coherence at the outset, so that it may be a better candidate
for a constructive “Ur”-calculus which would induce the known modal λ-calculi for computational and modal type theory
as specialised algebraic models.
Another important result has been obtained by Bellin, de Paiva and Ritter in [22] presenting a Curry–Howard corre-
spondence for CK proper, in the form of a natural deduction calculus with a category-theoretical semantics. However, the
proposed computational interpretation has the disadvantage that the modalities  and  are not explained independently
and locally in terms of introduction (constructors) and elimination (destructor) rules. The algebraic semantics of [22] is based
on the traditional sequent rule Γ,C  D →Γ,C D of logic K which (i) couples an occurrence of  on the right-hand
side of  with another occurrence of  on the left-hand side and (ii) introduces  globally on all context hypotheses Γ at
the same time. This amounts to a global treatment of context which is not fully in the spirit of Gentzen and the ultimate
objective reported in [22]: “[. . .] entering a context would correspond to making an assumption in natural deduction, while exiting
a context would correspond to discharging an assumption” as we understand it here.
In this paper we take a next step in this programme and present a sound and complete cut-free Gentzen calculus for CK
with independent introduction and elimination rules for  and  as in Masini’s work but for the pure system CK of [22].
Like the known calculi for CS4 concerning  [16,4] our calculus is of local nature and does not need explicit worlds as
labels. It is derived from the multi-sequent calculus [43] developed for multi-modal CK [44]. Though being cut-free, the
system in [43] is not in proper (ﬁrst-order) Gentzen format as its introduction and elimination rules involve sets rather than
individual formulas. Also, the cut-elimination proof was obtained by semantic means. Thus, the system in [43] is not suited
to be interpreted as a computational calculus of contexts. In this paper, we ﬁx the problem and present a local interpretation
of constructive  and  modalities. Each operator has its own intro and elim rule and both are dual similar to ∀ and ∃ in
intuitionistic logic.
Formally, our sequents for CK resemble the 2-sequents of Masini [45,29]
Γ1  Γ2 · · ·  Γn  Φ1  Φ2 · · ·  Φm (4)
which feature sequences of contexts Γi in the antecedent and sequences of contexts Φ j in the succedent. As Masini has
shown these are a good structure for  making it possible to avoid the explicit labelling traditionally used to obtain cut-
free representations in other intuitionistic modal calculi, notably IK [7] and other systems under Gabbay and Queiroz’
labelled deduction approach [46]. However, in contrast to Masini, our sequents offer more ﬁne-control for handling , 
by introducing the notion of a focus. The focus singles out one of the context compartments Γi in the antecedent as the
“current local point of construction”. This makes it possible to prevent using proofs of C without providing a reference
to some constructable context in which C can be used. In this way, C does not entail C as in the deontic system of
Masini. This solution is somewhat analogous to how intuitionistic predicate logic, or type theory, prevents the (classically
valid) proof of ∀x.φ(x)  ∃x.φ(x) which ﬁrst instantiates ∀x.φ(x) to obtain φ(x) and then concludes ∃x.φ(x) with x as
the existential ‘witness’: Type theory permits us to instantiate a proof ∀x.φ(x) by a term t to obtain φ(t) only if t is
constructable in the current environment. If there are no constants in the logic then ∃x.φ(x) is not provable from ∀x.φ(x).
The addition of a ‘focus’ may be seen as a structural reﬁnement of Masini’s 2-sequents. However, in contrast to the purely
proof-theoretic analysis of 2-sequents [29], our sequents are equipped with a possible worlds semantics which allows us to
obtain soundness and completeness theorems. While there is no proof provided in [29] for exactly what modal theory is
generated by the 2-sequent system we can show that our system derives precisely the theory CK deﬁned above. Moreover,
based on the Kripke semantics and the ‘focus’, it is possible to show that the 2-sequents can be restricted to consist
essentially of at most two context compartments on either side of the turnstile, i.e., n,m  2 in (4). Thus, they are of the
same outer form as the sequents used in modal type theory [16,4].
2. Syntax and semantics of CKn
The multi-modal theory CKn is set in the propositional language
C, D → A | ⊥ | C ∧ D | C ∨ D | C ⊃ D | ∃R.C | ∀R.C
where A ∈ Var ranges over a set of propositional variables and R ∈ Lab over modal labels representing binary relations.
The modalities may also be written with indices R , R in the tradition of classical modal logic [9]. Here, we prefer the
notation ∀R , ∃R for modalities to avoid indices and remind us of their origin as quantiﬁers. Note, that this is the common
notation for quantiﬁers as used in description logics [47].
Deﬁnition 1. (See [23,43].) A constructive interpretation or constructive model of CKn is a structure I = (I ,I ,⊥I , ·I)
consisting of
• a non-empty set I of worlds, the frame universe in which each element represents a partially deﬁned entity, process
or state of knowledge;
• a reﬁnement pre-ordering I , i.e., a reﬂexive and transitive relation on I ;
1470 M. Mendler, S. Scheele / Information and Computation 209 (2011) 1465–1490• a subset ⊥I ⊆ I of fallible worlds closed under reﬁnement and modal accessibility, i.e., x ∈ ⊥I and xI y or x RI y
implies y ∈ ⊥I ; also, x ∈ ⊥I implies there is y with x RI y;
• an interpretation function ·I mapping each modal label R ∈ Lab to a binary relation RI ⊆ I × I and each atomic
proposition A ∈ Var to a set ⊥I ⊆ AI ⊆ I which is closed under reﬁnement, i.e., x ∈ AI and xI y implies y ∈ AI .
Constructive models I of CKn extend the classical two-valued models of Kn by a pre-ordering I for capturing re-
ﬁnement between worlds and a notion of fallible entities ⊥I for interpreting empty information. The reﬁnement relation
xI y is typically understood as a (potential) increment of knowledge of an ideal intuitionist mathematician as s/he per-
forms constructions deciding the truth of sentences. Fallible elements b ∈ ⊥I may be thought of as over-constrained states
of information, self-contradictory objects of evidence or undeﬁned computations. A constructive interpretation induces a
truth valuation on arbitrary propositions as speciﬁed in the following Deﬁnition 2:
Deﬁnition 2. (See [23,43].) Let I = (I ,I ,⊥I , ·I) be a constructive model. The interpretation I is lifted from atomic ⊥,
A to arbitrary propositions as follows, where Ic =df I \ ⊥I is the set of non-fallible elements in I:
I =df I
(¬C)I =df
{
x
∣∣ ∀y ∈ Ic .xI y ⇒ y /∈ CI
}
(C ∧ D)I =df CI ∩ DI
(C ∨ D)I =df CI ∪ DI
(C ⊃ D)I =df
{
x
∣∣ ∀y ∈ Ic .
(
xI y & y ∈ CI) ⇒ y ∈ DI}
(∃R.C)I =df
{
x
∣∣ ∀y ∈ Ic .xI y ⇒ ∃z ∈ I .(y, z) ∈ RI & z ∈ CI
}
(∀R.C)I =df
{
x
∣∣ ∀y ∈ Ic .xI y ⇒ ∀z ∈ I .(y, z) ∈ RI ⇒ z ∈ CI
}
We will write I, x |
 C as an abbreviation for x ∈ CI . This is extended to sets Γ of propositions, i.e., I, x |
 Γ iff I, x |
 C
for all propositions C ∈ Γ . When there is no confusion we will identify I with ·I and simply write , , ⊥ instead of I ,
I , ⊥I .
We obtain the standard classical models of Kn whenever  is the identity relation and ⊥ empty. In general, the relation
I, x |
 C spreads out the validity of C across many -related worlds, in the sense that if I, x |
 C and x y then I, y |
 C .
At fallible worlds y ∈ ⊥ discrimination is switched off completely by making all propositions valid. This monotonicity of
truth is the characteristic feature of intuitionistic semantics. Notice that the deﬁnitions of (∃R.C)I and (∀R.C)I corresponds
to the readings (3) and (1), respectively. All the other clauses of Deﬁnition 2 make up the standard Kripke semantics of IPL
[48].
Apart from the philosophical importance of intuitionistic Kripke frames, partial information structures (⊥,) have found
widespread applications in Computer Science. This is not the place to review them. For illustration, we will consider just a
few examples (see also [43]) that suggest themselves in the context of knowledge representation. Moreover, we will show
that IK4/FS4, IK5/FS5 and the deontic scheme are not universally valid in constructive models. We shall see later how they
can be recovered if needed. Also we shall see how to interpret the other axioms of CS4.
Example 1. The deontic axiom ∀R.A ⊃ ∃R.A is not sound in CKn , since it is already unsound in classical Kn and by the
fact that every model in Kn is also a model in CK. Semantically this can be seen by observing that the classical non-serial
counter model is in particular a constructive model: Take the reﬂexive one-world interpretation I = {0} such that 0 0
and RI = ∅ for modal labels R ∈ Lab. Putting ⊥I = AI =df ∅ we have a constructive interpretation. Then, clearly 0 |
 ∀R.A
since 0 has no R-successors but at the same time it means 0 |
 ∃R.A.
Example 2. Also, the scheme IK5/FS5 is not part of CKn . Take I = {0,1,2} with R-connected worlds RI = {(0,2)},
reﬁnement pre-order I= {(0,0), (1,1), (2,2), (0,1)} and valuation CI = {2} and DI = ∅. Then, I,0 |
 ∃R.C ⊃ ∀R.D and
I,2 |
 C as well as I,2 |
 D . The implication I,0 |
 ∃R.C ⊃ ∀R.D holds trivially since no world which is -reachable from
0 satisﬁes ∃R.C . This is clear for 1 since it does not have an R-successor at all. Regarding world 0 it suﬃces to observe that
its -successor 1 does not satisfy ∃R.C . Thus, world 0 in this model is also a counter model showing that the proposition
(∃R.C ⊃ ∀R.D) ⊃ ∀R.(C ⊃ D) is not a theorem of CKn .
Example 3. A world x ∈  may be an abstraction of data records appearing in an abstract data context. Each reﬁnement y
of x has all the attributes of x and on those the same values, but possibly also additional attribute dimensions. E.g., x may
be the result of suppressing information in an attempt to optimise calculations on a large data base. Every application of a
projection on a data base table creates an abstraction in this sense.
More concretely, let a = (c,d1) and b = (c,d2) be two entries in a (relational) database that share the same ﬁrst attribute
but are distinguished in the second. If the attributes are referenced by relations $1 and $2 then the situation could be
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Table 1
Hilbert calculus for CKn .
(a) 1: C ⊃ (D ⊃ C)
2: ((C ⊃ (D ⊃ E)) ⊃ (C ⊃ D) ⊃ (C ⊃ E))
3: C ⊃ (D ⊃ (C ∧ D))
4: (C ∧ D) ⊃ C, (C ∧ D) ⊃ D
5: C ⊃ (C ∨ D), D ⊃ (C ∨ D)
6: (C ⊃ E) ⊃ ((D ⊃ E) ⊃ (C ∨ D ⊃ E))
7: ⊥ ⊃ C
(b) ∀K : (∀R.(C ⊃ D)) ⊃ (∀R.C ⊃ ∀R.D)
∃K : (∀R.(C ⊃ D)) ⊃ (∃R.C ⊃ ∃R.D)
(c) Nec: If C is a theorem, then so is ∀R.C
MP: If C and C ⊃ D are theorems, then so is D
Note: Negation ¬C can be coded as C ⊃ ⊥ and  as ⊥ ⊃ ⊥.
speciﬁed by a $1 c, a $2d1, b $1 c, b $2d2. Now let us abstract from the second attributes and consider the pairs as partially
deﬁned entities a = (c,?) and b = (c,?). Ignoring d1, d2 means that a and b carry the same information and thus
can no longer be distinguished. Since the pre-order  measures the information content we get a  b and b  a . This
cyclic reﬁnement relationship implies an abstract equivalence a ∼= b but not an identity a = b keeping in mind that both
sides have incompatible realisations a  a and b  b, respectively. The situation is depicted in Fig. 1. The dashed arrows
correspond to reﬁnement and solid arrows represent the attribute relations $1, $2. Note that both a , b have a fallible $2
attribute, viz. the $2-accessible ⊥, which corresponds to a computational deadlock when selecting $2 in a or b .
Entities a , b are indistinguishable and share exactly the same propositions. Formally, if Th(x) denotes the set of propo-
sitions validated by entity x, then Th(a) = Th(b). E.g., both ∃$1.C ∈ Th(a) = Th(b) and ∃$2.(D1 ∨ D2) ∈ Th(a) = Th(b)
since every reﬁnement of a , b has c |
 C as attribute for relation $1 and either d1 |
 D1 or d2 |
 D2 as attribute for $2. The
disjunction ∃$2.(D1 ∨ D2) captures the choice between the two realisations of a as a concrete individual, viz. (c,d1) and
(c,d2). On the other hand, this choice cannot be resolved at the abstract level as there is no single uniform choice of the
$2-attribute. This is reﬂected in the logic by the fact that ∃$2.Di /∈ Th(a) (i = 1,2) which means ∃$2.D1 ∨ ∃$2.D2 /∈ Th(a).
Abstractions like this cannot be expressed in intuitionistic modal logics where  distributes over ∨ and ∃$2.(D1 ∨ D2) is
semantically equivalent to ∃$2.D1 ∨ ∃$2.D2. Also, note that the Excluded Middle ∃$2.D1 ∨ ¬∃$2.D1 is not valid for a .
Regarding valid propositions, in Fig. 1, ∀$2.((D1 ∨ D2) ⊃ ¬C) is in Th(a), since every reachable attribute of $2 that is in
D1 or in D2 cannot be in C , which is only reachable via $1. Similarly ∀$1.(C ⊃ ¬(D1 ∨ D2)) is in Th(a), expressing that for
every $1 attribute c of every reﬁnement of a , it holds that if c |
 C , then c is neither contained in D1 nor D2.
2.1. Hilbert calculus for CKn
The Hilbert calculus is given in Table 1. Part (a) shows the usual axioms for intuitionistic propositional logic [48], specif-
ically 1–2 for ⊃, 3–4 for ∧, 5–6 for ∨ and 7 for inconsistency ⊥. Part (b) of Table 1 lists the two principles ∃K ,∀K for
universal and existential context quantiﬁcations following Wijesekera’s modal rules presented in [12]. These come from
generalised monotonicity depicted by the rules M1, M2 below with the important property of having in the conclusion of
each rule a universal quantiﬁer over the context Γ :
Γ  C ⊃ D
M1∀R.Γ  ∀R.C ⊃ ∀R.D
Γ  C ⊃ D
M2∀R.Γ  ∃R.C ⊃ ∃R.D
Finally, the rules of Modus Ponens MP and Necessitation Nec are given in item (c) of Table 1.
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each Ci (i  n) is either a hypothesis Ci ∈ Θ , or a substitution instance of an axiom scheme from Table 1(a), (b) or arises
from earlier propositions C j ( j < i) through MP or Nec as in Table 1(c). This is lifted to sets of propositions Φ , i.e., Θ H Φ
in the usual way.
3. The Gentzen sequent calculus G-CKn
In [23] it was shown that the constructive interpretation constitutes an adequate Kripke model theory for CK and in [43]
a sound and complete tableau-style calculus was presented for its multi-modal extension CKn which, however, is not suited
for computational interpretations. We are now going to reconstruct this system as a cut-free Gentzen calculus for CKn
which provides a starting point for extracting an associated λ-calculus. The new calculus, G-CKn , has the same local nature
and symmetrical treatment of  and , in terms of left and right introduction rules corresponding to constructors and
destructors of proof terms, as the calculi for computational and modal type theory, but without prescribing any additional
axioms. Moreover, all the rules have a semantic interpretation as local constructions on Kripke worlds.
G-CKn sequents have the form Σ˙  Ψ in which Σ˙ is the antecedent and Ψ is the succedent. Like the 2-sequents of
Masini [29] both are sequences of sets of propositions in which the information is separated into individual scopes. But
now these scope compartments are connected by named accessibility relations and we also add a focus marker. Speciﬁcally,
a general antecedent looks like
Σ˙ = Γ1 S2 Γ2 S3 · · · S f Γ f S f+1 · · · Sn Γn (5)
where Si ∈ Lab are modal labels. Each Γi is a scope Γi = {Ci1,Ci2, . . . ,Cimi } containing local assumptions Cij . As seen in (5)
one of these scopes is distinguished by a special marker  called the focus. The associated set of local assumptions Γ f is the
scope in focus. The focus splits the antecedent into two parts Σ˙ = Σc Σh , the context Σc = Γ1 S2 Γ2 S3 · · · S f Γ f before
the focus and the hypotheses Σh = Γ f S f+1 · · · Sn Γn after the focus. It is useful to think of the focus marker  as a binary
operator on sequences of scopes. Note that the scope in focus Γ f logically belongs to both parts of the antecedent, i.e., the
context and the hypotheses.
The context part Σc of the antecedent represents the assumption that the scope in focus Γ f is accessible through a
connected path S2, S3, . . . , S f of modal context switches passing through scopes Γi (1 i < f ). Each Γi speciﬁes the infor-
mation available in the respective scope. The focus marks the active scope relative to which the sequent’s actual judgement
Σh  Ψ is made. The judgement informally states that if the sequence of scopes speciﬁed by the hypothesis Σh is con-
structable, then the sequence of assertion scopes speciﬁed by the succedent
Ψ = Φ1 R2 Φ2 R3 Φ3 R4 · · · Rm Φm (6)
in some modal labels R j ∈ Lab, is constructable, too. Just like with other (classical or non-classical) multi-sequent calculi,
the notions of constructibility left and right of  are dual: While the hypothesis sets Γi in Σh and their succession are to
be taken in a conjunctive sense, the assertion sets Φ j and their succession in Ψ are interpreted disjunctively. This means
that Ψ as in (6) is constructable if some scope Φ j (1 j m) is reachable (from the focus point) through a connected path
R2, R3, . . . , R j so that at least one of the propositions D ∈ Φ j is true. Constructibility on the hypothesis side Σh means that
all scopes Γi ( f  i  n) are reachable on a (single) connected path and all assumptions hold true at the respective scope
position. The precise semantic interpretation is given in Deﬁnition 3 in Section 4.
The number of scope separators  in Σh to the right of the focus is called the length of the antecedent Σ˙ and the
number of separators  in Σc before the focus is called its depth. E.g., the context Σ˙ in (5) has depth f − 1 and length
n − f . Thus, an antecedent with zero depth and zero length is a single set Σ˙ = Γ . There is no need for a focus marker
in the succedent Ψ since it always starts at the focus point of the antecedent. It is implicit and ﬁxed to the ﬁrst set Φ1.
Accordingly, the succedent Ψ has no depth but only a length m− 1.
Note that our sequents have only one focus alignment and thus make essentially only one  judgement. In contrast, the
2-sequents of Masini [29] have more coupling between antecedent and succedent in the sense that  is implicitly repeated
from left to right for every scope in Σ or Ψ up to the maximum of m and n, patching up with Γi = ∅ and Φ j = ∅ as
needed. Therefore, Masini’s 2-sequents (for one modal label) are somewhat more expressive than ours. On the other hand,
as we will see, this expressiveness is not needed to capture the mechanics of CK. Speciﬁcally, we will show that it suﬃces
to consider sequents with at most two scopes on both sides, i.e., where n,m  2. Moreover, the explicit introduction of a
focus and the possibility to implicitly shift antecedent and succedent against each other is useful to implement a reading of and  which does not presuppose the deontic scheme C ⊃C .
Before we can present the rules of the calculus to derive sequents Σ˙  Ψ we need to agree on a couple of meta-level
syntactic conventions to handle sequents generically. To begin with, we will treat each scope Γ in the antecedent Σ˙ (and
similarly for Ψ ) as an unordered list without duplications, so that if C ∈ Γ then Γ is the same as Γ,C and C,Γ . This has
the advantage that we do not need explicit structural rules for exchange and contraction implementing the meaning of the
comma separator.
A similar abstraction applies to the focus separator. We may place the focus at the beginning of the respective local
scope Γ as done in (5) but also write Γ  to make it appear at the end. Furthermore, since the focus is a marking of the
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Σ1,C Σ2  C,Ψ
⊥L
Σ1,⊥, Σ˙2  Ψ
Σ1,C1, Σ˙2  Ψ ∧L1
Σ1,C1 ∧ C2, Σ˙2  Ψ
Σ1,C2, Σ˙2  Ψ ∧L2
Σ1,C1 ∧ C2, Σ˙2  Ψ
Σ˙  D1,Ψ ∨R1
Σ˙  D1 ∨ D2,Ψ
Σ˙  D2,Ψ ∨R2
Σ˙  D1 ∨ D2,Ψ
Σ1,C1, Σ˙2  Ψ Σ1,C2, Σ˙2  Ψ ∨L
Σ1,C1 ∨ C2, Σ˙2  Ψ
Σ˙  D1,Ψ Σ˙  D2,Ψ ∧R
Σ˙  D1 ∧ D2,Ψ
Σ1   C1 Σ1,C2  Σ˙2  Ψ ⊃L
Σ1,C1 ⊃ C2  Σ˙2  Ψ
Σ1,C Σ2  D ⊃R
Σ1 Σ2  C ⊃ D,Ψ
Fig. 2. Logical rules.
Σ1 S Σ2  Ψ1 Ax f
Σ1  S Σ2  Φ S Ψ1
Σ˙  ∅ R D ∃R
Σ˙  ∃R.D,Ψ
Σ1  S C  Ψ ∃L
Σ1,∃S.C Σ  Ψ
Σ1 S C, Σ˙2  Ψ ∀L
Σ1,∀S.C S Σ˙2  Ψ
Σ1 R ∅   D ∀R
Σ1 Σ  ∀R.D,Ψ
Fig. 3. Modal rules.
whole scope, it does not matter if we put it inside the scope so that, e.g., {A, B,C} = {A} {B,C} = {A, B} {C} = {A, B,C} 
or even {A, B} {C} = {C} {A, B} = {B,C} {A,C}, etc. In this sense Γ and Γ  are the same as ∅ Γ and Γ ∅. Our rules for
sequents Σ˙  Ψ and their semantics are invariant under such identiﬁcations treating  just like a special comma in the set
abstraction. This gives full freedom for splitting up antecedents Σ˙ at the focus scope. E.g., if Σ˙ = Γ1 S {A, B,C} T Γ2
then Σ˙ = Σc Σh in several ways:
Σc = Γ1 S ∅, Σh = {A, B,C} T Γ2
Σc = Γ1 S {A}, Σh = {B,C} T Γ2
Σc = Γ1 S {A, B,C}, Σh = {A, B,C} T Γ2
Of course, at the level of scope sequences we enforce associativity of the separators S for breaking up a context at any
point as in Σ = Σ ′ S Σ ′′ where Σ ′ and Σ ′′ are the corresponding sub-sequences. This includes the special case that one
of the sub-sequences is empty. E.g., if Σ ′′ =  is empty then Σ ′ S Σ ′′ = Σ ′ . This is not the same as Σ ′ S ∅ keeping in
mind the difference between an empty sequence and a singleton sequence consisting of an empty set of assumptions. We
may assume that in a sequent Σ˙  Ψ neither Σ nor Ψ will ever be empty, i.e., we have n,m 1 in (5) and (6).
We will write Σ,C to say that the last scope contains C , i.e., Σ,C = Σ ′ S Γ,C , where Σ ′ is the initial sub-sequence
of Σ without the ﬁnal scope. If Σ ′ is empty then of course Σ ′ S Γ,C is the same as the singleton sequence Γ,C .
Similarly, C,Σ means that C is in the ﬁrst scope, i.e., C,Σ = Γ,C S Σ ′ . Again, Σ ′ may be the empty sequence in which
case Γ,C S Σ ′ = Γ,C . Finally, not surprisingly, Σ  and Σ indicate that the focus is in the ﬁrst and last scope of Σ ,
respectively, while Σ˙ says that the focus is somewhere inside Σ and we do not care about where.
The Gentzen calculus G-CKn consists of the rules given in Figs. 2 and 3, separated into those dealing with the propo-
sitional connectives and those dealing with the modalities. The former, shown in Fig. 2, are essentially the well-known
multi-sequent version of Gentzen’s LJ for intuitionistic logic [49] embedded into sequents with scope sequences on both
sides of the turnstile. The binary operators ∧, ∨, ⊃ have right and left introduction rules, ⊥ only has a left introduction.
Notice that all left rules ∧Li , ∨L, ⊃L, ⊥L require the operator to be introduced to appear in the context part of the an-
tecedent, i.e., in the focus scope or to the left of it. Except for ∧L where it could be lifted, this constraint is essential to
preserve soundness, as we shall see. Similarly, all the right rules ∧R , ∨R , ⊃R introduce the main operator in the ﬁrst
conclusion scope of the succedent. Again, this is crucial for soundness, except for rule ∨R which could be more liberal.
Notice, since G-CKn satisﬁes weakening and contraction, the system where ∨R1 and ∨R2 are combined to form the rule is
equivalent to our system.
Σ˙  D1, D2,Ψ ∨R
Σ˙  D1 ∨ D2,Ψ
The axiom rule Axm combines both restrictions. It states that an assumption in the focus can be used to justify the same
proposition in the conclusion at the focus scope.
1474 M. Mendler, S. Scheele / Information and Computation 209 (2011) 1465–1490The rules for modal operators in Fig. 3 warrant more detailed explanations and in the following we discuss them one by
one. The rules are cast in the spirit of Gentzen and characterise each modal operator by way of a left and a right introduction
rule. These exhibit the modalities ∀R and ∃R as internalisations of the scoping structure explicit in the separators R on
the left and on the right sides of a sequent:
• Applying the right rule ∃R in forward direction introduces an existential modality ∃R.D on the right, wrapping up
a R separator. Consider ﬁrst the special case Ψ = ∅, i.e., the instance Σ˙  ∅ R D ⇒ Σ˙  ∃R.D . This says that if
D is constructable one R step forward from the scope under the assumptions Σ˙ then ∃R.D is constructable at the
current scope under the assumptions Σ˙ . This is the constructor rule for proofs of existential modalities. Considering the
disjunctive semantics of assertions on the right of  this inference can be extended by an arbitrary weakening Ψ as
seen in Fig. 3.
• The left introduction rule ∃L wraps up a separator S in the antecedent in terms of an existential ∃S . Again, let Σ1 = ∅
and Σ =  . Then ∃L becomes ∅ S C  Ψ ⇒ ∃S.C   Ψ stating that if Ψ is constructable from the assumption that
C is accessible through relation S from the scope in focus, then Ψ is constructable under the assumption ∃S.C . The
idea is that from any hypothetical proof of ∃S.C we can obtain S-access to a context scope where a hypothetical proof
of C is available. Thus, ∃L is the destructor rule of existentials. The actual rule ∃L in Fig. 3 generalises this by a side
assumption Σ1 in the antecedent of both the premise and conclusion, and also by a weakening Σ in the conclusion.
Note that ∃L is always applied at the scope in focus.
• The left rule ∀L introduces a universal modality ∀S.C into a context scope from an assumption C one scope to the right
and reachable through modal label S . In the special instance where Σ1 = ∅ and Σ2 =  this is the rule ∅ S C   Ψ ⇒
∀S.C S ∅   Ψ . This says that if Ψ is constructable under the assumption C in the current focus, which happens to be
accessible from some outer context using an S-step, then it suﬃces to have the assumption ∀S.C in the outer scope in
order to construct Ψ . This is justiﬁed because we may instantiate a hypothetical proof of the universal ∀S.C across S to
give a proof of C . In this way the rule ∀L is the destructor for proofs of ∀ modalities. As seen in Fig. 3 this works under
arbitrary side assumptions Σ1 and Σ˙2. As we will see below it is important that the introduction rule is only applied
left of the focus.
• The right introduction rule ∀R plays the role of a constructor of proofs for ∀ modalities. Suppose we want to prove
the universal proposition ∀R.D under the context assumptions Σ1, i.e., the sequent Σ1   ∀R.D . Rule ∀R permits us to
reduce this to the sequent Σ1 R ∅   D . I.e., we extend the original context Σ1 by a fresh R-accessible scope with
empty information and move the focus forward into the new scope; from there we construct a proof of D . If we can
do that without any assumptions about the new context scope then, obviously, we have implicitly constructed a proof
of the universal ∀R.D relative to the original focus. The sequences Σ and Ψ in the presentation of ∀R in Fig. 3 permit
weakening.
• Finally, consider the rule Ax f . It permits us to move the focus one position to the left across a separator S in the
antecedent by adding a corresponding scope and separator on the right in the succedent, where the choice of the
assertion set Φ in the fresh scope is arbitrary. This is a synchronous move to the left of the focus. Looking at the
rule in backward direction, from the point of view of proof search, rule Ax f justiﬁes one S step in the succedent
by a corresponding S step from the antecedent. For instance, if Σ1 = Φ = ∅, then Ax f reduces the task of deriving
∅ S Σ2  ∅ S Ψ to that of ﬁnding a derivation ∅ S Σ2   Ψ , which essentially eliminates S from the problem.
In this sense Ax f is for modal labels what Axm is for propositions.
The rules in Fig. 3 tie up the modalities closely with context scopes and suggest a natural interpretation of proof objects
as constructors and destructors of context. The existentials ∃ encapsulate implicit context scopes. A proof of ∃R.C constructs
a R-accessible scope and a proof of C within this scope. The rules ∃L and ∃R tell us how to open and close scopes,
respectively. A proof of ∀R.C is a scope-polymorphic function which returns a proof of C in any R-accessible scope. The
rule ∀R creates such a generic method and ∀L instantiates a scope-polymorphic proof to a particular scope. With their
left and right introduction rules the modalities ∃R and ∀R formally behave much like constructive existential and universal
quantiﬁers of context scopes. This analogy has been highlighted clearly by Masini in his work on 2-sequents [45,29]. Our
modal rules are reﬁnements of those of [29] by an explicit focus marker that localises the point of construction and gives
better control of the relative positions of antecedent and succedent. The rules enforce restrictions on the position of the
active proposition relative to the focus marker. E.g., in ∃L and ∃R the existential propositions ∃S.C , ∃R.D must be at the
focus. In ∀L the universal ∀S.C must be on the left and in ∀R the proposition ∀R.D is within the scope in focus. As we shall
see below, removing these restrictions would be unsound for general constructive Kripke models. In particular, the deontic
axiom C ⊃C , which is unsound, is prevented by the focus restriction on ∀L.
4. Soundness
In this section we show that G-CKn is sound for CKn . We also discuss the role of the focus marker to achieve this and
some natural rules for various extensions of CKn , speciﬁcally IK/FS, CS4, PLL/CL and the deontic system of Masini.
Theorem 1 (Soundness). If ∅   D is derivable in G-CKn then D is a theorem of CKn.
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precisely the propositions valid in all constructive Kripke models as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 2. Hence, it suﬃces to show that
all rules of G-CKn are sound in the sense that they only generate valid sequents. It will be useful to rephrase validity in
terms of refutability of sequents.
Deﬁnition 3 (Refutability). Let I = (I ,I ,⊥I , ·I) be a constructive Kripke model and Σ = Γ1 S2 Γ2 S3 · · · Sn Γn
be a context sequence. Let α = a1,a2, . . . ,a f be a sequence of infallible worlds ai ∈ IC such that f  n. We say that α
satisﬁes Σ , written α sat Σ if the following recursive conditions are fulﬁlled:
• if α = a and Σ = Γ then I,a |
 Γ ;
• if α = a and Σ = Γ S Σ ′ then I,a |
 Γ and for all a′ ∈ I such that a I a′ there exists b ∈ I with a′ SI b and
b sat Σ ′;
• if α = a,b,α′ and Σ = Γ S Σ ′ then I,a |
 Γ , (a,b) ∈I ; SI ;I and b,α′ sat Σ ′ .
We say that a world a ∈ I refutes Σ , written a unsat Σ ,
• if Σ = Γ then a is infallible and for all C ∈ Γ , I,a |
 C ; otherwise,
• if Σ = Γ R Σ ′ then for all C ∈ Γ , I,a |
 C and there exists a′ ∈ I with aI a′ such that for all b ∈ I with a′RIb
we have b unsat Σ ′ .
Finally, let Σc Σh  Ψ be a sequent of depth f − 1. We say α refutes Σc Σh  Ψ , in symbols α unsat Σc Σh  Ψ , if
α sat Σc , a f sat Σh and a f unsat Ψ . The sequent is refutable (in I) if there exists a sequence of infallible worlds α that
refutes the sequent (in I).
The complexity of Deﬁnition 3 is owed to the structure of general sequents. The special cases we are ultimately interested
in are simple sequents of the form ∅   D . It is easy to see that such a sequent is refutable according to Deﬁnition 3 iff
there exists a world a ∈ I such that I,a |
 D . Thus, if we can show that ∅   D is not refutable, then I |
 D for all
constructive interpretations I . By semantic completeness of CKn [43] this means D is a theorem of CKn . Accordingly, the
proof of Theorem 1 (see Appendix A) shows that all rules of G-CKn only derive irrefutable sequents. The semantic proof
highlights clearly the central role of the focus restrictions in the calculus and the consequences of dropping them.
An instructive alternative for proving soundness is to show that every derivation ∅  D can be simulated to give H D ,
where H denotes Hilbert derivability. We achieve this by a structural transformation of sequents into propositions and
of sequent rules into Hilbert derivations. Speciﬁcally, we deﬁne translations [Σ  Ψ ]h for sequents, [Σ]c for antecedent
contexts and [Ψ ]g for succedent contexts as follows:
[Γ   Ψ ]h =df Γˆ ⊃ [Ψ ]g
[Γ S Σ  Ψ ]h =df
(
Γˆ ∧ ∃S.[Σ]c) ⊃ [Ψ ]g
[Γ S Σ˙  Ψ ]h =df Γˆ ⊃ ∀S.[Σ  Ψ ]h
[Γ S Σ]c =df Γˆ ∧ ∃S.[Σ]c
[Γ ]c =df Γˆ
[Φ R Ψ ]g =df Φˇ ∨ ∃R.[Ψ ]g
[Φ]g =df Φˇ
where Γˆ denotes the conjunction and Φˇ the disjunction of all propositions in Γ and Φ , respectively. A general sequent
Σ˙  Ψ of the shape
Γ1 S2 · · · S f Γ f S f+1 Γ f+1 · · · Sn Γn  Φ1 R2 Φ2 · · · Rm Φm
turns into
Γˆ1 ⊃ ∀S2.
(
Γˆ2 ⊃ ∀S3.
(· · · ∀S f .
(
(
Γˆ f ∧ ∃S f+1.
(
Γˆ f+1 ∧ ∃S f+2.(Γˆ f+2 ∧ · · · ∃Sn.Γˆn) · · ·
))
⊃ (Φˇ1 ∨ ∃R2.
(
Φˇ2 ∨ ∃R3.(Φˇ3 ∨ · · · ∃Rm.Φˇm) · · ·
))) · · ·))
or, more concretely, for sequents with two scopes in the antecedent and the succedent:
[Γ1 S Γ2   Φ1 R Φ2]h = Γˆ1 ⊃ ∀S.
(
Γˆ2 ⊃ (Φˇ1 ∨ ∃R.Φˇ2)
)
[Γ1 S Γ2  Φ1 R Φ2]h = (Γˆ1 ∧ ∃S.Γˆ2) ⊃ (Φˇ1 ∨ ∃R.Φˇ2)
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nation Γˆ in the antecedent and the disjunctive combination Φˇ in the succedent. In particular notice that the translation
involves all operators of the language. This is a difference to the interpretation of intuitionistic 2-sequents given in [29]
which does not involve the diamond modality ∃. The constants  and ⊥ are used in the empty combinations ∅ˇ = ⊥ and
Γˆ = . It is convenient to drop these empty cases, systematically replacing ∅ˇ ∨ D , ∅ˆ ∧ D and ∅ˆ ⊃ D by D in the syntactic
compilation above.
One proves by induction on derivations that for every derivation of a sequent Σ˙  Ψ using the rules in Figs. 2 and 3
there exists a Hilbert proof of [Σ˙  Ψ ]h . Thus, if ∅   D we get H [∅   D]h , i.e., H D .
Example 4. Consider the rule application
∅ R A,C   D ∀L∀R.A R C   D
The premise sequent translates into [∅ R A,C   D]h = ∀R.[A,C   D]h = ∀R.((A ∧ C) ⊃ [D]g) = ∀R.((A ∧ C) ⊃ D). The
conclusion sequent yields [∀R.A R C   D]h = ∀R.A ⊃ ∀R.[C   D]h = ∀R.A ⊃ ∀R.(C ⊃ [D]g) = ∀R.A ⊃ ∀R.(C ⊃ D). Thus,
in Hilbert terms this application of ∀L becomes
∀R.((A ∧ C) ⊃ D) ∀L∀R.A ⊃ ∀R.(C ⊃ D)
which is essentially an instance of axiom IK1/∀K . The other axiom IK2/∃K is hidden in rule Ax f . Speciﬁcally, the instance
∅ R C   D Ax f∅ R C  ∅ R D
has the translated premise [∅ R C   D]h = ∀R.[C   D]h = ∀R.(C ⊃ D) and the conclusion becomes [∅ R C  ∅ R
D]h = ∃R.C ⊃ [∅ R D]g = ∃R.C ⊃ ∃R.D .
Let us call a sequent of the form Γ   Φ with depth 0 and length 0, in which Γ and Φ do not contain any modal
operators, intuitionistic. It is easy to see that every derivation of an intuitionistic sequent only contains intuitionistic sequents
and only involves logical rules from Fig. 2. These are precisely the standard rules of the multi-sequent Gentzen system LJ
[49]. Hence, CKn is a conservative extension of IPL. The intuitionistic restriction lies in the rule ⊃R which requires the
succedent in its premise to be a single proposition D . As is well known, if we relax the rule to ⊃R∗ to read Σ1,C Σ2 
D,Ψ ⇒ Σ1 Σ2  C ⊃ D,Ψ , then we get back classical logic and a derivation of the Excluded Middle Principle Σ˙  C ∨ ¬C .
5. Extensions of G-CKn
5.1. Deontic extension [29]
In Example 1 we have seen that the deontic axiom is not generally valid. By soundness, the sequent ∅   ∀R.A ⊃ ∃R.A
is not derivable. The attempt to prove it yields the unique tree
?∀R.C   ∅ R C ∃R∀R.C   ∃R.C ⊃R∅   ∀R.C ⊃ ∃R.C
which cannot be completed. The left rule ∀L is not applicable at the open leaf because of the lack of a R successor in the
antecedent across which the move of C in ∀R.C R ∅ over R to yield ∅ R C could be performed. This is analogous to the
situation in intuitionistic predicate logic where the sequent ∀x.C  ∃x.C is not derivable unless we assume all domains are
non-empty. In G-CK we can obtain R-seriality by way of an extra rule and then complete the proof tree as follows:
Σ1 R ∅  Ψ R-serial
Σ1 Σ2  Ψ
Axm∅ R C   C ∀L∀R.C R ∅   C Ax f∀R.C R ∅  ∅ R C R-serial∀R.C   ∅ R C ∃R∀R.C   ∃R.C ⊃R∅   ∀R.C ⊃ ∃R.C
The rule R-serial is sound in all constructive models that are serial, i.e., for which every world has an R-successor. As an
axiom, R-serial is equivalent to assuming ∃R..
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We can now explain proof-theoretically why disjunctive distribution ∃R.(C ∨ D) ⊃ (∃R.C ∨∃R.D) fails. Consider the proof
tree which starts like this:
?∃R.(C ∨ D)   ∃R.C ∨ ∃R.D ⊃R∅   ∃R.(C ∨ D) ⊃ ∃R.C ∨ ∃R.D
At the top we have two possible rules to proceed, ∃L and ∨R . The latter is not sensible as it would break up the succedent
disjunction ∃R.C ∨ ∃R.D before we have split the two cases of C ∨ D in the antecedent. Therefore, we apply ∃L:
?∅ R C ∨ D  ∃R.C ∨ ∃R.D ∃L∃R.(C ∨ D)   ∃R.C ∨ ∃R.D ⊃R∅   ∃R.(C ∨ D) ⊃ ∃R.C ∨ ∃R.D
Now we must continue with ∨R since it is the only rule applicable. Rule ∨L for case analysis on C ∨ D does not apply
because it does not have the focus. There is no way to move the focus right to get ∅ R C ∨ D   ∃R.C ∨ ∃R.D since the
rule Ax f which would do that is not applicable at this point. To apply Ax f , the succedent would need to be of the form
∅ R E . But this means we should use rule ∃R to one of the existentials ∃R.C or ∃R.D . However, to do this we need to
break up the disjunction ∃R.C ∨ ∃R.D in the succedent using ∨R ﬁrst:
?∅ R C ∨ D   C Ax f∅ R C ∨ D  ∅ R C ∃R∅ R C ∨ D  ∃R.C ∨R∅ R C ∨ D  ∃R.C ∨ ∃R.D ∃L∃R.(C ∨ D)   ∃R.C ∨ ∃R.D ⊃R∅   ∃R.(C ∨ D) ⊃ ∃R.C ∨ ∃R.D
Of course, this does not help because now we must prove succedent C under the disjunctive hypothesis C ∨ D which is
too weak. Intuitively, the construction of a proof for ∃R.(C ∨ D) ⊃ (∃R.C ∨ ∃R.D) creates a tie between (i) accessing the
disjunction C ∨ D on the input side which necessarily takes us inside the R-context behind ∃R and (ii) using the case analysis
in the succedent to decide the disjunction ∃R.C ∨ ∃R.D which is outside the R-context. Hence, the failure of disjunctive
distribution can be traced to the restriction of ∨L which does not apply to the right of the focus. If we lift this and relax
∨L to become ∨L∗ also including the inference by which Σ1  R C,Σ2  Ψ and Σ1  R D,Σ2  Ψ implies Σ1  R
C ∨ D,Σ2  Ψ , then the axiom ∃R.(C ∨ D) ⊃ (∃R.C ∨ ∃R.D) becomes derivable. Alternatively, one can relax ∃R to ∃R∗:
Σ˙  Φ R D,Ψ ⇒ Σ˙  ∃R.D,Φ R Ψ to obtain this axiom scheme. Both ∨L∗ and ∃R∗ are sound in constructive models
satisfying conﬂuence between  and R , i.e., where we have −1 ; R ⊆ R ;−1. 
5.3. Non-fallibility FS3/IK3
The nullary form of disjunctive distribution ∃R.⊥ ≡ ⊥, or equivalently ∃R.⊥ ⊃ ⊥, is not a theorem for general con-
structive models due to the possible presence of fallible worlds. In the proof system it is not derivable because ⊥L is only
applicable to inconsistencies in the context, i.e., to the left of the focus. The only possible derivation tree
?∅ R ⊥  ⊥ ∃L∃R.⊥   ⊥ ⊃R∅   ∃R.⊥ ⊃ ⊥
places the empty disjunction ⊥ as a hypothesis on the right of the focus. Under the focus restrictions this fails to justify
⊥ in the succedent, either by rule ⊥L or by Axm . Of course, if we use a more general rule ⊥L∗ deriving all instances of
Σ1 R ⊥,Σ2  Ψ then the above derivation for ∃R.⊥ ⊃ ⊥ can be completed. Like for Disjunctive Distribution there is an
alternative for enforcing ∃R.⊥ ≡ ⊥ in terms of a right rule. We can add the rule R-infallible, as seen below, to do the job:
Σ˙  Φ R ∅ R-infallible
Σ˙  Φ,Ψ
⊥L
∅ R ⊥   ∅ Ax f∅ R ⊥  ⊥ R ∅ R-infallible
∅ R ⊥  ⊥ ∃L
∃R.⊥   ⊥ ⊃R
∅   ∃R.⊥ ⊃ ⊥
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5.4. Scheme FS5/IK5
The intuitionistic modal logic IK/FS [8,6] is an extension of CK including the axioms of Non-Fallibility, Disjunctive
Distribution discussed in the previous examples, and the FS5/IK5 axiom scheme (∃R.C ⊃ ∀R.D) ⊃ ∀R.(C ⊃ D) which cannot
be derivable in CK since it has a constructive counter model (see Example 2). Under uniform proof strategy (applying
regular, invertible right rules) we obtain the derivation tree
?∃R.C ⊃ ∀R.D R C   D ⊃R∃R.C ⊃ ∀R.D R ∅   C ⊃ D ∀R∃R.C ⊃ ∀R.D   ∀R.(C ⊃ D) ⊃R∅   (∃R.C ⊃ ∀R.D) ⊃ ∀R.(C ⊃ D)
in which the leaf sequent ∃R.C ⊃ ∀R.D R C   D expects us to prove that D follows from C under the assumption that in
some R-predecessor context we have the implication ∃R.C ⊃ ∀R.D . But the focus rests in the context of the assumption C
and thus we cannot apply rule ⊃L. In contrast to the examples of Disjunctive Distribution and Non-Fallibility above where
the focus restriction prevents forward reasoning, here we hit the question of backward reasoning. In order to argue validity
(irrefutability) of ∃R.C ⊃ ∀R.D R C   D we must be able to move our point of view into the scope in which ∃R.C ⊃ ∀R.D
resides: looking forward we would then argue that R C implies ∃R.C which would then be used to obtain ∀R.D from the
implication ∃R.C ⊃ ∀R.D . This universal truth ∀R.D then would permit us to propagate D across R into the original focus
to justify D in the antecedent. However, the rules of CKn do not permit this speculative move of the focus. They are single
threaded with a single focus which commits us to apply ⊃L with the information available at this point. Note that we could
derive the theorem with a modiﬁed left implication rule ⊃L∗
Σ1 R Σ2  C Σ1, D R Σ2  Ψ ⊃L∗
Σ1,C ⊃ D R Σ2  Ψ
which permits us to use an implication to the left of the focus without dropping R Σ2. The completed proof then is:
Axm∅ R C   C Ax f∅ R C  ∅ R C ∃R∅ R C  ∃R.C
AxmR D,C   D ∀L∀R.D R C   D ⊃L∗∃R.C ⊃ ∀R.D R C   D ⊃R∃R.C ⊃ ∀R.D R ∅   C ⊃ D ∀R∃R.C ⊃ ∀R.D   ∀R.(C ⊃ D) ⊃R∅   (∃R.C ⊃ ∀R.D) ⊃ ∀R.(C ⊃ D)
No surprise, ⊃L∗ is not sound for arbitrary constructive models. However, ⊃L∗ is valid for models satisfying the frame
condition −1 ; R ;⊆ R ;−1.
5.5. CS4
Many applications, speciﬁcally modal type theories, are based on the constructive logic CS4 [3,16] which extends CK (in
a single modal label R , writing  and  rather than ∃R and ∀R) by the axiom schemes
T : C ⊃ C T : C ⊃C4: C ⊃C 4: C ⊃C
CS4 is also called JS4 for Judgemental S4 [15]. As shown in [25] this logic is the CK theory of constructive models with a
reﬂexive and transitive modal relation R which satisﬁes the frame condition R ;⊆ ; R . These frame properties give rise
to corresponding sequent rules seen in Fig. 4 which implement the CS4 axioms in G-CK as follows:
AxmC   C T
C   ∅ R C ∃R
C   ∃R.C ⊃R  C ⊃ ∃R.C
Axm∅ R C   C ∀L∀R.C R ∅   C T∀R.C   C ⊃R  ∀R.C ⊃ C
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Σ˙  Ψ1 R Ψ2
Σ1 R Σ˙2  Ψ T
Σ1, Σ˙2  Ψ
Σ1 R Σ˙2  Ψ 4
Σ1 R Γ R Σ˙2  Ψ
Σ˙  Ψ1 R Φ R Ψ2 4
Σ˙  Ψ1 R Ψ2
Fig. 4. Rules for CS4.
Axm∅ R C   C ∀L∀R.C R ∅   C 4∀R.C R ∅ R ∅   C ∀R ,∀R∀R.C   ∀R.∀R.C ⊃R  ∀R.C ⊃ ∀R.∀R.C
Axm∅ R ∅ R C   C Ax f∅ R ∅ R C  ∅ R C ∃L∅ R ∃R.C   ∅ R C Ax f∅ R ∃R.C  ∅ R ∅ R C ∃L∃R.∃R.C   ∅ R ∅ R C 4∃R.∃R.C   ∅ R C ∃R∃R.∃R.C   ∃R.C ⊃R  ∃R.∃R.C ⊃ ∃R.C
Soundness of T and T stem from reﬂexivity of R , while soundness of 4 and 4 arise from transitivity of R and the
frame property R ;⊆ ; R . Observe how G-CK reveals the symmetric nature of the axioms of CS4 and their universal role
for handling context scopes on the left and on right of . We note that the G-CK-rule 4 (Fig. 4) is actually a rendering
of the axiom scheme ∃R.(C ∨ ∃R.D) ⊃ ∃R.(C ∨ D) which is the “right” way to axiomatise transitivity of R in CK. It can be
derived from the combination of the Hilbert axioms T and the simpler form of 4 as above.
5.6. Necessitation and lax logic PLL/CL
As we will see below, by cut admissibility, the calculus admits the rule of Modus Ponens, i.e., for every derivation
∅   C ⊃ D and ∅   C there is a derivation of the sequent ∅   D . In fact, we have the Modus Ponens in the strong form in
arbitrary contexts, so that Σ   C ⊃ D and Σ   C implies Σ   D . This is nothing but the elimination rule for ⊃ in natural
deduction. We also have the (admissible) rule of Necessitation, i.e., ∅   D implies ∅   ∀R.D . Of course, this rule depends
on the context being empty. It cannot be used as a natural deduction introduction rule for ∀ since Σ   D does not imply
Σ   ∀R.D . E.g., we have D   D but not D   ∀R.D . In fact, the attempt to derive this sequent
?
D R ∅   D ∀R
D   ∀R.D
necessarily fails because the axiom rule Axm does not apply for sequent D R ∅   D in which assumption D appears
in the context left of the current focus. This restriction on Axm is crucial for soundness of the calculus since otherwise
D ⊃ ∀R.D were derivable which would trivialise the ∀R modality. In classical logics this would be pointless since then ∃R ,
which is derivable from ∀R , trivialises as well. However, in constructive logics ∃R has its own life and may well survive the
∀-collapse. Sometimes this is exactly what we want. For instance, this happens in lax logic (PLL) [24,30] where one replaces
Axm in CS4 by the “backward-looking” Ax∗m
Ax∗mΣ1, D R Σ2  D,Ψ
encoding axiom D ⊃ ∀R.D which is sound in frames satisfying R ⊆ [25]. Given Ax∗m we easily derive the tensorial strength
axiom of PLL, (C ∧ ∃R.D) ⊃ ∃R.(C ∧ D) as follows
Ax∗mC R D   C AxmC R D   D ∧R
C R D   C ∧ D Ax fC R D  ∅ R C ∧ D ∃L
C,∃R.D   ∅ R C ∧ D ∃R
C,∃R.D   ∃R.(C ∧ D) ∧L
C ∧ ∃R.D   ∃R.(C ∧ D) ⊃R∅   (C ∧ ∃R.D) ⊃ ∃R.(C ∧ D)
As a side remark we note that if we relaxed Axm to become applicable to assumptions right of the focus, say Σ1  R
C,Σ2  C,Ψ we would trivialise ∃R since then ∃R.C ⊃ C would become a theorem.
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In this section we show that the cut-free derivation system G-CKn given in Figs. 2 and 3 is complete for CKn . Further-
more, as it turns out, we only ever need at most two scopes on either side of the sequent turnstile. We show that the
calculus enforces some structural invariants which make it possible to work with tight sequents (Def. 4) without losing
completeness. This result highlights the local nature of reasoning in CKn .
To prove completeness we need some auxiliary facts on weakening and commutation of rules. Let us write Σ ⊆ Σ ′
if Σ ′ is a weakening of Σ in the sense that it has the same separators as Σ and each scope of Σ is a subset of the
corresponding scope of Σ ′ . This is deﬁned inductively by the conditions (i)  ⊆  and (ii) if Γ ⊆ Γ ′ and Σ ⊆ Σ ′ then Γ R
Σ ⊆ Γ ′ R Σ ′ for all R ∈ Lab. Then, deﬁne extension Σc Σh Σ ′c Σ ′h of antecedents by the condition that Σ ′c = Σ ′c1,Σ ′c2
and Σ ′h = Σ ′h1,Σ ′h2 so that Σc ⊆ Σ ′c2 and Σh ⊆ Σ ′h1. Thus, the extension Σ ′c Σ ′h of Σc Σh possibly enlarges the set of
assumptions and adds further scopes to the left of the context Σc and to the right of the hypotheses Σh . For succedents we
deﬁne extension Ψ  Ψ ′ as for hypotheses, i.e., Ψ ′ = Ψ ′1,Ψ ′2 with Ψ ⊆ Ψ ′1.
Deﬁnition 4. A sequent Σ˙  Ψ is called tight if the following holds:
(i) the antecedent Σ˙ has length  1;
(ii) the succedent Ψ has length  1 and also contains exactly one proposition;
(iii) all scopes of the antecedent Σ˙ more than two places to the left of  are empty.
In other words, a tight sequent has one of the shapes
∅ S1 ∅ S2 · · · ∅ S f Γ f S f+1 Γ f+1  Ψ
∅ S1 ∅ S2 · · · ∅ S f−1 Γ f−1 S f Γ f   Ψ
where Ψ is either of the form D or ∅ R D . A derivation is called tight if all sequents appearing in it are tight.
Lemma 2.
(i) For every derivation Σ˙1  Ψ1 and Σ˙1  Σ˙2 , Ψ1  Ψ2 there is a derivation Σ˙2  Ψ2 of the same height or less. Moreover, if the
derivation of Σ˙1  Ψ1 and the sequent Σ˙2  Ψ2 is tight then the derivation of Σ˙2  Ψ2 is also tight.
(ii) If Σ˙  ⊥ then also Σ˙  Ψ for arbitrary Ψ . If the derivation Σ˙  ⊥ and sequent Σ˙  Ψ are tight then the derivation of Σ˙  Ψ is
tight.
(iii) Every (tight) derivation D can be transformed into another (tight) derivation D ’ of same height or less in which every occurrence
of a rule ∃L is immediately preceded by an application of Ax f .
Proof. See Appendix A. 
Completeness depends on the admissibility cut which we state ﬁrst:
Lemma 3 (Cut admissibility). IfΣ   D and Σ, D   Ψ thenΣ   Ψ . Moreover, if bothΣ   D and Σ, D   Ψ are tight derivations,
then so is Σ   Ψ .
Proof. See Appendix A. 
Theorem 4 (Completeness). Every theorem D of CKn has a tight derivation ∅  D in G-CKn.
Proof. Using Lemma 2 we show how to simulate every Hilbert proof of CKn in G-CKn (see Sec. 2.1) using only tight
sequents. Recall that CKn is the logic generated by the axioms of intuitionistic propositional logic IPL together with the two
modal axiom schemes (R ∈ Lab)
∀K : ∀R.(C ⊃ D) ⊃ (∀R.C) ⊃ (∀R.D)
∃K : ∀R.(C ⊃ D) ⊃ (∃R.C) ⊃ (∃R.D)
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G-CK. First, we generate tight derivations ∅   C for all intuitionistic axioms C using the rules in Fig. 2. Tight derivations
for ∀K and ∃K are obtained by way of the rules in Figs. 2 and 3 as follows:
Axm∅ R C   C Axm∅ R D,C   D ⊃L∅ R C ⊃ D,C   D ∀L∀R.(C ⊃ D) R C   D Ax f∀R.(C ⊃ D) R C  ∅ R D ∃L∀R.(C ⊃ D),∃R.C   ∅ R D ∃R∀R.(C ⊃ D),∃R.C   ∃R.D ⊃R∀R.(C ⊃ D)   (∃R.C) ⊃ (∃R.D) ⊃R∅   ∀R.(C ⊃ D) ⊃ (∃R.C) ⊃ (∃R.D)
Axm∅ R C   C Axm∅ R D,C   D ⊃L∅ R C ⊃ D,C   D ∀L∀R.(C ⊃ D) R C   D ∀L∀R.(C ⊃ D),∀R.C R ∅   D ∀R∀R.(C ⊃ D),∀R.C   ∀R.D ⊃R∀R.(C ⊃ D)   (∀R.C) ⊃ (∀R.D) ⊃R∅   ∀R.(C ⊃ D) ⊃ (∀R.C) ⊃ (∀R.D)
Second, Modus Ponens is essentially contained in the admissibility of cut stated in Lemma 3, which preserves tightness. For
suppose we have derived ∅   C ⊃ D and ∅   C using tight derivations. Then, by rules Axm and ⊃L we get C,C ⊃ D   D
from which two applications of cut yield a tight derivation of ∅   D as desired. For Necessitation we exploit (i) of Lemma 2,
i.e., the fact that our system is closed under context weakening. Speciﬁcally we use that Σ˙  Ψ implies ∅ R Σ˙  Ψ for all
R ∈ Lab (preserving tightness). In particular, this implies that if ∅   D then ∅ R ∅   D and thus ∅   ∀R.D by rule ∀R . 
7. Conclusion
In this work we present a constructive modal logic and its cut-free Gentzen calculus as a formal system to express
context-dependency. The system is derived from a multi-sequent calculus for multi-modal CK, whose direct analogue in
description logics is cALC as has been reported in [43]. The system exhibits sequents equipped with Kripke semantics
which allowed us to obtain soundness and completeness theorems. It has been shown that other non-classical modal logics
such as IK, CS4, PLL/CL, or Masini’s deontic system of 2-sequents arise as specialised theories of CK.
In future work we aim at introducing proof terms for our Gentzen system, especially to extract proof terms/natural
deduction rules for  and , as an extension of the simply typed lambda calculus that expresses context-dependent com-
putations in structured data, e.g. computational knowledge bases or databases. We hope that such a system can constitute
a formal grounding for a modally typed functional programming language that ﬁnds practical adoption in the domains of
knowledge representation and database processing languages. For such applications it will be important that the semantic
properties of the accessibility relations (so-called “roles” in Description Logics) can be adjusted ﬂexibly, rather that being
hardwired as in CS4, PLL/CL and other specialised modal type theories like [31,21].
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Appendix A. Proofs
Theorem 1 (Soundness). If ∅   D is derivable in G-CKn then D is a theorem of CKn.
Proof. Throughout the proof we ﬁx an interpretation I and omit superscripts, writing  and R for I and RI , respectively,
and x |
 C rather than I, x |
 C . For each of the rules we assume a sequence α = a1,a2, . . . ,a f−1,a f of non-fallible worlds
which refutes the conclusion sequent and from it construct a sequence β refuting (one of) the premise sequent(s). This
proves that all rules, when read top–down, preserve irrefutability. We will tacitly use the following simple facts about sat
and unsat where α = a1,a2, . . . ,a f−1,a f is a sequence of non-fallible worlds and a non-fallible:
• for single propositions we have a sat C iff a |
 C and a unsat C iff a |
 C ;
1482 M. Mendler, S. Scheele / Information and Computation 209 (2011) 1465–1490• α sat Σ,C iff α sat Σ and a f |
 C ;
• a unsat D,Ψ iff a unsat Ψ and a |
 D;
• if α sat Σ and a f  a′f where a′f non-fallible, then (a1,a2, . . . ,a f−1,a′f ) sat Σ .
To prove soundness of the axioms Axm and ⊥L we need to argue that their conclusion instances are irrefutable. This
is done by contradiction. Suppose α unsat Σ1,C Σ2  C,Ψ . Then, by Deﬁnition 3, this means that the last world a f of α
marking the focus point has a f |
 C , since α sat Σ1,C and at the same time a f |
 C due to a f unsat C,Ψ . Obviously, this is
impossible. Regarding ⊥L, assume we have α unsat Σ1,⊥, Σ˙2  Ψ with α = a1,a2, . . . ,a f . Then, because ⊥ appears before
the focus point we must have ai |
 ⊥ for some 1 i  f . But this contradicts the assumption that all ai are infallible. Hence,
both Axm and ⊥L generate irrefutable sequents. Note that the focus restriction for ⊥L is crucial. We have seen (Section 5.3)
that if occurrences of ⊥ on the right of the focus could derive arbitrary conclusions then we would make the axiom of
non-fallibility ∃R.⊥ ≡ ⊥ derivable.
The proof of soundness for rules ∧L1, ∧L2 and ∨R1, ∨R2 is trivial. The restriction in ∧Li that the conjunction C1 ∧ C2
appear before the focus point can be dropped, similarly in ∨R1 and ∨R2 where the expansion of Di to D1 ∨ D2 could take
place in any scope of the succedent.
Consider rule ∨L and let α = a1,a2, . . . ,a f be a sequence of infallible worlds so that α unsat Σ1,C1 ∨ C2, Σ˙2  Ψ where
Σ˙2 = Σ21 Σ22. Then, α sat Σ1,C1∨C2,Σ21 by deﬁnition. Let the disjunction C1∨C2 be in the scope with index i, 1 i  f ,
i.e., ai |
 C1 ∨ C2. Then we have two cases. If ai |
 C1 then α sat Σ1,C1,Σ21, from which it follows easily that α unsat
Σ1,C1, Σ˙2  Ψ . If ai |
 C2 then α sat Σ1,C2,Σ21 and hence α unsat Σ1,C2, Σ˙2  Ψ . Thus, at least one of the two premise
sequents of ∨L must be refuted by α. Note that this depends on the fact that the disjunction C1 ∨ C2 occurs in the context
of the antecedent, i.e., before or at the focus. Otherwise, if C1 ∨ C2 refers to unknown worlds of the hypothesis, forward from
the last a f , then the case analysis cannot be done. We have seen (Section 5.2) that such a forward case analysis would make
Disjunctive Distribution ∃R.(C ∨ D) ≡ (∃R.C ∨ ∃R.D) derivable.
Rule ∧R needs the conjunction it works on to be present at the focus point, i.e., in the succedent context directly next
to the turn-stile. Suppose α unsat Σ˙  D1 ∧ D2,Ψ . Then, by deﬁnition, a f unsat D1 ∧ D2,Ψ which implies a f |
 D1 ∧ D2. But
this means a f |
 D1 or a f |
 D2. In the ﬁrst case one shows without diﬃculty that α unsat Σ˙  D1,Ψ and in the second
case that α unsat Σ˙  D2,Ψ . This is what we need to argue soundness of ∧R . Now, observe that if the conjunction is not
in the ﬁrst scope but in the second, say a f unsat Φ1 R D1 ∧ D2,Ψ , then we would only know that there is some -
successor of a f all of whose R-successors are not in D1 or not in D2. But since the choice between refutation of D1 or D2
depends on these R-successors, we cannot make a static case distinction at a f . In models where we have the distribution
∃R.(D1 ∧ D2) ≡ ∃R.D1 ∧ ∃R.D2 this is possible but these are rather special classes of models.
Next take a look at ⊃L. Assume α unsat Σ1,C1 ⊃ C2,Σ21 Σ22  Ψ , i.e., α sat Σ1,C1 ⊃ C2,Σ21, a f sat Σ22 and
a f unsat Ψ . From α sat Σ1,C1 ⊃ C2,Σ21 we conclude that ai |
 C1 ⊃ C2 for 1  i  f . Therefore, using ai  ai , we
have ai |
 C1 or ai |
 C2. If the former is true we can state a1,a2, . . . ,ai unsat Σ1   C1 and in the latter case we get
α unsat Σ1,C2,Σ21 Σ22  Ψ .
Arguing soundness of ⊃R is analogous to standard intuitionistic logic where the removal of the succedent context Ψ
is owed to the intuitionistic reﬁnement pre-ordering : Suppose α unsat Σ1 Σ2  C ⊃ D,Ψ , or in other words, α sat Σ1,
a f sat Σ2, a f unsat C ⊃ D,Ψ . Because of the latter a f |
 C ⊃ D which means there is a -successor of a f , a f  a′f such that
a′f |
 C and a′f |
 D . Note that the latter implies that a′f is non-fallible. Furthermore, since sat is closed under reﬁnement,
also a′f sat Σ2. However, unsat is not closed under  and therefore we cannot conclude that a′f unsat Ψ since a f = a′f in
general. All we have is a′f unsat D . This means for the sequence α
′ = a1,a2, . . . ,a f−1,a′f we can state α′ unsat Σ1,C Σ2  D
which is the premise of our rule ⊃R . We do not have α′ unsat Σ1,C Σ2  D,Ψ which would give us classical logic and
derive C ∨ ¬C ≡ . Also note that the implication C ⊃ D must appear in the ﬁrst context (pertaining to the focus) of the
succedent. In a statement such as a f unsat Φ R C ⊃ D,Ψ the implication would not give us any statically exploitable
information about a f .
Now we come to look at the modal rules. Let us start with rule Ax f . Suppose α = a1,a2, . . . ,a f refutes the conclusion
sequent Σ1 S Σ2  Φ S Ψ1, i.e., α sat Σ1, a f sat ∅ S Σ2, and a f unsat Φ S Ψ1. The latter a f unsat Φ S Ψ1 means
there is a f  a′f such that for all a′f S b we have b unsat Ψ1. But from a f sat ∅ S Σ2 it follows that there exists an S-
successor b of a′f , a
′
f S b, such that b sat Σ2. Hence, b unsat Ψ1, which in particular implies b is non-fallible as one can
show by induction on the structure of Ψ1. Now since  is reﬂexive we get (a f ,b) ∈  ; S ; which means for β = α,
b = (a1,a2, . . . ,a f ,b) that β sat Σ1 S ∅. Taking all together yields that β refutes the premise sequent Σ1 S Σ2  Ψ1 of
rule Ax f .
Next consider rule ∃R assuming we have a sequence α unsat Σ˙  ∃R.D,Ψ with α = a1,a2, . . . ,a f . Deﬁnition 3 tells us
that a f unsat ∃R.D,Ψ which means a f |
 ∃R.D . Hence, there must exist a -successor a′f of a f all of whose R-successors
falsify D , i.e., a f  a′f and for all b, a′f R b we have b |
 D which is the same as b unsat D . But this is nothing but a f unsat
∅ R D which in turn means that α refutes the premise sequent Σ˙  ∅ R D .
Regarding rule ∃L, take α = a1,a2, . . . ,a f refuting Σ1,∃S.C Σ2  Ψ . From this we get α sat Σ1,∃S.C , a f sat Σ2 and
a f unsat Ψ . Now α sat Σ1,∃S.C implies α sat Σ1 and a f |
 ∃S.C , i.e., for all a f  a′f there is b with a′f S b and b |
 C . Since
b |
 C is the same as b sat C these are precisely the conditions to state a f sat ∅ S C . Hence, overall, α unsat Σ1 S C  Ψ .
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(a1,a2, . . . ,ak) and α2 = (ak+1,ak+2, . . . ,a f ) such that α1 sat Σ1,∀S.C , speciﬁcally ak |
 ∀S.C , and moreover (ak,ak+1) ∈
 ; S ; and α2 sat Σ21, a f sat Σ22 as well as a f unsat Ψ . It is not diﬃcult to see that ak |
 ∀S.C and (ak,ak+1) ∈  ; S ;
implies ak+1 |
 C . This gives α unsat Σ S C,Σ21 Σ22  Ψ as desired.
Finally, we deal with R . A sequence α refuting the conclusion sequent Σ1 Σ  ∀R.D,Ψ would obtain α sat Σ1 and
a f unsat ∀R.D or, equivalently, a f  |
 ∀R.D . The latter implies there is a successor world a f  a′f and a′f R b such that b |
 D .
Then (a f ,b) ∈ ; R ; (exploiting reﬂexivity b  b) and b unsat D which means β = (a1,a2, . . . ,a f ,b) refutes the premise
sequent Σ1 R ∅  D . Observe that b |
 D implies b is non-fallible. 
Lemma 2.
(i) For every derivation Σ˙1  Ψ and extensions Σ˙1  Σ˙2 ,Ψ1  Ψ2 there is a derivation Σ˙2  Ψ2 of the same height or less. Moreover,
if the derivation of Σ˙1  Ψ and the sequent Σ˙2  Ψ2 is tight then the derivation of Σ˙2  Ψ2 is also tight.
(ii) If Σ1 Σ2  ⊥ then also Σ1,Σ ′   Ψ for arbitrary Ψ . If the derivation Σ1 Σ2  ⊥ and sequent Σ1,Σ ′   Ψ are tight then the
derivation of Σ1,Σ ′  Ψ is tight.
(iii) Every (tight) derivation D can be transformed into another (tight) derivation D ’ of same height or less in which every occurrence
of a rule ∃L is immediately preceded by an application of Ax f .
Proof. (i) This is obvious by inspection of the rules. All extensions in the antecedent Σ˙1  Σ˙2 and succedent Ψ1  Ψ2 can
be pushed through all rules of the considered derivation. Note that all rules are generic to permit extensions both at the
beginning and the end of the antecedent. On the succedent side, however, we can only extend at the end due to the form
of the right rules. If we extend a tight sequent Σ˙1  Ψ1 to become another tight sequent Σ˙2  Ψ2 then Ψ1 = Ψ2 and the
extension Σ˙1  Σ˙2 consists in adding empty scopes to the front of Σ1 and possibly increasing the sets of propositions in
the last two scopes. We do not need to make any other changes to the sequents of a tight derivation of Σ˙1  Ψ1, whence
tightness is preserved.
(ii) Let D be a derivation tree for Σ1 Σ2  ⊥. We prove Σ1,Σ ′   Ψ for arbitrary Ψ by induction on the structure of
D and show that this derivation contains exactly the same sequents except that some of the antecedents are extended by
Σ ′ and the succedents are replaced by Ψ . Hence, tightness is preserved if Ψ is of the form D or ∅ R D . Obviously, the
last rule of D cannot be Ax f nor any of the right rules ∧R , ∨R , ⊃R , ∃R , ∀R . So, D must end in a left rule or one
of the axioms. Suppose ﬁrst that Σ1 Σ2  ⊥ is derived with Axm as the last rule. Then, ⊥ is contained in the antecedent
hypotheses Σ1 in the focus scope, so that Σ1,Σ ′   Ψ is obtained by ⊥L. Also, if the last rule of D is ⊥L this very same
rule will do the job for arbitrary Ψ . Clearly, in both cases all we have changed is the rule name and the succedent which is
now Ψ rather than ⊥. Now consider a left rule such as ⊃L:
...D1
Σ11   C1
...D2
Σ11,C2,Σ12 Σ2  ⊥ ⊃L
Σ11,C1 ⊃ C2,Σ12 Σ2  ⊥
By induction hypothesis there must be a derivation D∗2 of Σ11,C2,Σ12,Σ ′   Ψ in which the sequents of the original D2
have all succedents replaced by Ψ . From D∗2 we easily construct the desired result by application of ⊃L:
...D1
Σ11   C1
...D∗2
Σ11,C2,Σ12,Σ ′   ⊥ ⊃L
Σ11,C1 ⊃ C2,Σ12,Σ ′   ⊥
which has the same structure as D except that some of the succedents have changed to Ψ . Similar inductive arguments
apply in case of the other left rules. The point is that all left rules are ignorant of the succedent which could be ⊥ or Ψ
and can be applied arbitrarily left of the focus. This proves (ii).
(iii) We show that every instance of ∃L can be pushed up the derivation tree (towards the leaves) until it hits an instance
of Ax f . Furthermore, it is easy to check that these transformations preserve tightness. Let D be a derivation which ends in
an arbitrary instance of ∃L:
...D
Σ1 R C  Ψ ∃L
Σ1,∃R.C Σ2  Ψ
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thereby eliminate ∃L. The resulting derivation tree has height 1 which is strictly less than the original D which consisted
of at least two rules in sequence. All left rules ∧L, ∨L, ⊃L at the end of D can be swapped with ∃L, e.g., take ⊃L
...D′1
Σ1   C1
...D′2
Σ1,C2,Σ2 R C  Ψ ⊃L
Σ1,C1 ⊃ C2,Σ2 R C  Ψ ∃L
Σ1,C1 ⊃ C2,Σ2,∃R.C Σ3  Ψ
which transforms into
...D′1
Σ1   C1
...D′2
Σ1,C2,Σ2 R C  Ψ ∃L
Σ1,C2,Σ2,∃R.C Σ3  Ψ ⊃L
Σ1,C1 ⊃ C2,Σ2,∃R.C Σ3  Ψ
Similar commutations are possible for ∧L and ∨L. Next take a look at ∃L as the last rule, which means we have two ∃L in
sequence. The top one overrides the one below as follows:
...D′
Σ1 S D  Ψ ∃L
Σ1,∃S.D Γ R C  Ψ ∃L
Σ1,∃S.D,Γ,∃R.C Σ2  Ψ →
...D′
Σ1 S D  Ψ ∃L
Σ1,∃S.D Γ,∃R.C,Σ2  Ψ
since Σ1,∃S.D,Γ,∃R.C Σ2 is the same as Σ1,∃S.D Γ,∃R.C,Σ2. An application of ∀L permutes like this:
...D′
Σ11 S D,Σ12 S D  Ψ ∀L
Σ11,∀S.D S Σ12 R C  Ψ ∃L
Σ11,∀S.D S Σ12,∃R.C Σ2  Ψ →
...D′
Σ11 S D,Σ12 R C  Ψ ∃L
Σ11 S D,Σ12,∃R.C Σ2  Ψ ∀L
Σ11,∀S.D S Σ12,∃R.C Σ2  Ψ
Note that if Σ11,∀S.D S Σ12,∃R.C Σ2  Ψ is tight then the new interpolating sequent Σ11 S D,Σ12,∃R.C Σ2  Ψ
must be tight, too. It is important to observe that ∀L only applies to  separators left of the focus while ∃L wraps up a
separator to the right of the focus. This means these rules cannot interfere. E.g. the following is not a possible instance of
∀L above ∃L:
...D′
Σ1 R D,C  Ψ ∀L (not applicable in this form!)
Σ1,∀R.D R C  Ψ ∃L
Σ1,∀R.D,∃R.C Σ2  Ψ
because ∀R.D is introduced by ∀L from D to the right of the focus. Such an application is not needed and would not
directly commute with ∃L. Finally we come to study the right rules at the end of D. It is not diﬃcult to see that all the
right rules ∧R , ∨R , ∃R must commute downwards as they are ignorant of the antecedent. The right rule ∀R can be used to
eliminate ∃L completely:
...D′
Σ1 S ∅   D ∀R
Σ1 R C  ∀S.D,Ψ ′ ∃L
Σ1,∃R.C Σ2  ∀S.D,Ψ ′ →
...D′
Σ1 S ∅   D ∀R
Σ1 ∃R.C,Σ2  ∀S.D,Ψ ′
Regarding ⊃R we have the direct commutation
...D′
Σ1, D1 R C  D2 ⊃R
Σ1 R C  D1 ⊃ D2,Ψ ′ ∃L
Σ1,∃R.C Σ2  D1 ⊃ D2,Ψ ′ →
...D′
Σ1, D1 R C  D2 ∃L
Σ1, D1,∃R.C Σ2  D2 ⊃R
Σ1,∃R.C Σ2  D1 ⊃ D2,Ψ ′
Again, the new intermediate sequent Σ1, D1,∃R.C Σ2  D2 in the transformed derivation is certainly tight provided
Σ1,∃R.C Σ2  D1 ⊃ D2,Ψ ′ is. This completes the proof of (iii) of Lemma 2. Observe that this inductive process of pushing
∃L upwards in the tree does not introduce extra rules and thus does not increase the height of the tree, as required. 
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derivations, then so is Σ   Ψ .
Proof. The proof is entirely standard. One shows by simultaneous induction on the height of the derivation trees and the
size of the cut proposition that every instance of the cut is admissible in the system G-CK. In this process instances of
cut are recursively pushed up the derivation tree towards the leaves, i.e., towards instances of rules Axm and ⊥L, where
they disappear. It is not diﬃcult to check, in each case, that indeed these transformations preserve tightness. Let us take an
instance of cut:
...D
Σ   D
...E
Σ, D,Σ ′   Ψ
cut
Σ,Σ ′   Ψ
We assume by (iii) of Lemma 2 that D and E are normalised so every occurrence of ∃L is coupled with Ax f . The transfor-
mations we identify below in order to move cut upwards into D and E will preserve this normal form property. We also
use weakening (i) and (ii) of Lemma 2. All these are primitive recursive transformations that can be combined to eliminate
cuts by local transformations on the structure of derivations. For the purposes of this proof we ﬁnd it convenient to consider
Ax f along with Axm and ⊥L as an axiom rather than a rule.
(D axioms) Because of the structure of the succedent the last rule of D cannot be Ax f . If D is an application of Axm then
D is contained in the focus slot of the antecedent, whence Σ, D = Σ and derivation E is already a derivation of Σ,Σ ′   Ψ .
Thus the rule cut is eliminated. If D ends in ⊥L then ⊥ is contained in Σ , whence we might just as well derive the desired
conclusion Σ,Σ ′   Ψ by ⊥L directly without detour, as this rule works for arbitrary succedents.
(D left rules) If D ends in a left rule ∧L, ∨L, ⊃L, ∀L then the premise sequent(s) Σ˙ ′  D leading to Σ   D have the
same succedent D . Moreover using Lemma 2(i) one shows that D and E can be massaged to become a derivation D′′ of
Σ ′′   D and E ′′ for sequent Σ ′′, D,Σ ′   Ψ with the same height or smaller than D and E , respectively. By induction
hypothesis we can cut the smaller sub-derivation D′′ for Σ ′′   D with E ′′ for Σ ′′, D,Σ ′   Ψ to obtain Σ ′′,Σ ′   Ψ .
Applying the left rule, which we removed from D, to Σ ′′,Σ ′   Ψ gives Σ,Σ ′   Ψ by implicit contractions. Consider the
rule ∀L as an example:
...D′
Σ1 S C,Σ2   D ∀L
Σ1,∀S.C S Σ2   D
...E ′
Σ1,∀S.C S Σ2, D,Σ ′   Ψ cut
Σ1,∀S.C S Σ2,Σ ′   Ψ
Here ∀L and cut commute as follows:
...D′ weakened
Σ1,∀S.C S C,Σ2   D
...E ′ weakened
Σ1,∀S.C S C,Σ2, D,Σ ′   Ψ cut
Σ1,∀S.C S C,Σ2,Σ ′   Ψ ∀L
Σ1,∀S.C S Σ2,Σ ′   Ψ
using contraction on ∀S.C in the last rule ∀L. It is not diﬃcult to convince oneself that the weakened sequents are tight
whenever the original sequents were. For instance, if the addition of proposition ∀S.C into the end sequent Σ1,∀S.C S
C,Σ2   D of the weakened version of derivation D′ violates tightness, then also the sequent Σ1,∀S.C S Σ2   D in the
original derivation would not be tight in the ﬁrst place. Similar commutations, possibly using weakening, work for all the
other left rules ∧L, ∨L, ⊃L since they are applicable to propositions in any scope to the left of the focus. Thus, these left
rules commute with the application of cut. But what about ∃L? By assumption the derivation D is normal (Lemma 2(iii))
and thus if ∃L is its last rule, the next to last rule is Ax f and the succedent would have to be of the form Φ R Ψ rather
than D . Hence this case is excluded by pre-processing.
(D right rules) Thus, as regards D, all that remains to be considered are the right rules ∧R , ∨R , ⊃R , ∃R , ∀R . These
cannot be reduced by themselves but require analysis of the last rule of E , which we move to next.
(E axioms) E cannot end in Ax f by the form of the antecedent of its conclusion, which has length 0. If the last rule
of E is Axm involving the cut proposition D , then Ψ = D,Ψ ′ . Then, sub-derivation D already ﬁts the bill since it can be
weakened by Lemma 2(i) to derive Σ,Σ ′   D,Ψ ′ . If Axm instead involves some context assumption from Σ or Σ ′ then
we get the conclusion Σ,Σ ′   Ψ from Axm right away without cut. If E ends in ⊥L and ⊥ is from Σ,Σ ′ we can use ⊥L
directly to obtain the conclusion of the cut. If D = ⊥ we argue as before, viz. that then derivation D with sequent Σ   ⊥
implies Σ,Σ ′   Ψ by Lemma 2(ii). In all these cases the derivation generated for Σ,Σ ′   Ψ is tight if the derivation E
for Σ, D,Σ ′   Ψ is.
(E right rules) If E ends in any of the right rules ∧R , ∨R , ∃R then its immediate sub-derivation(s) E ′ derive(s) a sequent
Σ, D,Σ ′   Ψ ′ . We can then apply cut to D and E ′ by induction hypothesis to produce Σ,Σ ′   Ψ ′ . Applying the right
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are ∀R and ⊃R . In case of ∀R we have a cut like this
...D
Σ   D
...E ′
Σ, D,Σ ′ R ∅   E ∀R
Σ, D,Σ ′   ∀R.E
cut
Σ,Σ ′   ∀R.E
which we can move upwards (commute with ∀R) as follows
...D
Σ   D
...E ′
Σ, D,Σ ′ R ∅   E cut
Σ,Σ ′ R ∅   E ∀R
Σ,Σ ′   ∀R.E
In case the last (right) rule of E is ⊃R we have
...D
Σ   D
...E ′
Σ, D,Σ ′, E1   E2 ⊃R
Σ, D,Σ ′   E1 ⊃ E2 cut
Σ,Σ ′   E1 ⊃ E2 →
...D
Σ   D
...E ′
Σ, D,Σ ′, E1   E2 cut
Σ,Σ ′, E1   E2 ⊃R
Σ,Σ ′   E1 ⊃ E2
The permutation of right rules bear no risk of breaking tightness, they do not change the antecedent or only add to the
focus point.
(E left rules) If the last rule of E is an application of a left rule ∧L, ∨L, ⊃L, ∃L, ∀L which does not involve the cut
proposition D then it commutes with cut possibly using weakening Lemma 2(i) and implicit contraction. A special case in
this class is ∃L for which we must distinguish several cases. First, the proposition ∃R.C introduced by E on the left may
also be part of the antecedent in D:
...D
Σ ′′,∃R.C   D
...E ′ ∃L
Σ ′′,∃R.C, D,Γ   Ψ
cut
Σ ′′,∃R.C,Γ   Ψ
where Σ = Σ ′′,∃R.C and Σ ′ = Γ . Here the application of ∃L may introduce not just ∃R.C on the left but also some of the
propositions D,Γ in focus. If it also introduces D , say
...D
Σ ′′,∃R.C   D
...E ′
Σ ′′,Γ ′ R C  Ψ ∃L
Σ ′′,∃R.C, D,Γ   Ψ
cut
Σ ′′,∃R.C,Γ   Ψ
in which Γ ′ ⊆ Γ , then we may eliminate the cut directly by weakening from E ′:
...E ′ weakened
Σ ′′,Γ R C  Ψ ∃L
Σ ′′,∃R.C,Γ   Ψ
which cannot destroy tightness since we expand from Γ ′ to Γ at the focus point. It remains to tackle the case where ∃L
does not introduce D but instead D is part of the assumptions in sub-derivation E ′:
...D
Σ ′′,∃R.C   D
...E ′
Σ ′′, D R C  Ψ ∃L
Σ ′′,∃R.C, D,Γ   Ψ
cut
Σ ′′,∃R.C,Γ   Ψ
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conclusion of E ′ as above can be accounted for by weakening in Σ ′′ . We invoke normalisation (iii) from Lemma 2, which
makes sure that the last rule of E ′ is Ax f , i.e., Ψ = Φ R Ψ1 and we end up with
...D
Σ ′′,∃R.C   D
...E ′′
Σ ′′, D R C   Ψ1 Ax fΣ ′′, D R C  Φ R Ψ1 ∃L
Σ ′′,∃R.C, D,Γ   Φ R Ψ1 cut
Σ ′′,∃R.C,Γ   Φ R Ψ1
This can be reordered easily using cut and a weakened version of E ′′:
...D
Σ ′′,∃R.C   D
...E ′′ weakened
Σ ′′,∃R.C, D R C   Ψ1 cut
Σ ′′,∃R.C R C   Ψ1 Ax fΣ ′′,∃R.C R C  Φ R Ψ1 ∃L
Σ ′′,∃R.C,Γ   Φ R Ψ1
where in the last rule ∃L we have made use of implicit contraction which identiﬁes Σ ′′,∃R.C,Γ and Σ ′′,∃R.C,∃R.C,Γ .
The other situation to be considered is where the introduced proposition ∃R.C is not part of the antecedent in D, i.e.,
...D
Σ   D
...E ′
Σ, D,Σ ′′ R C  Ψ ∃L
Σ, D,Σ ′′,∃R.C,Γ   Ψ
cut
Σ,Σ ′′,∃R.C,Γ   Ψ
where Σ ′ = Σ ′′,∃R.C,Γ . Again by normalisation (Lemma 2(iii)) we can assume without loss of generality that E ′ ends in
Ax f and Ψ = Φ R Ψ1:
...D
Σ   D
...E ′′
Σ, D,Σ ′′ R C   Ψ1 Ax fΣ, D,Σ ′′ R C  Φ R Ψ1 ∃L
Σ, D,Σ ′′,∃R.C,Γ   Φ R Ψ1 cut
Σ,Σ ′′,∃R.C,Γ   Φ R Ψ1
This permutes into another application of cut of smaller height:
...D
Σ   D
...E ′′
Σ, D,Σ ′′ R C   Ψ1 cut
Σ,Σ ′′ R C   Ψ1 Ax fΣ,Σ ′′ R C  Φ R Ψ1 ∃L
Σ,Σ ′′,∃R.C,Γ   Φ R Ψ1
One checks without diﬃculties that all these instances of ∃L at the end of E are permuted with cut preserving tightness
and the normal form property keeping ∃L and Ax f together. Finally, we need to treat the cases of D ending in a right rule
and E ending in a corresponding left rule introducing the same operator in the cut proposition D . This leaves 5 cases to
discuss:
(D/∧R,E/∧L)
...D′1
Σ   D1
...D′2
Σ   D2 ∧R
Σ   D1 ∧ D2
...E ′
Σ, Di,Σ ′   Ψ ∧LiΣ, D1 ∧ D2,Σ ′   Ψ cut
Σ,Σ ′   Ψ
Here we apply cut between D′i and E ′ . The sub-derivation D′j for j = i is dropped.
(D/∨R,E/∨L)
...D′
Σ   Di ∨RiΣ   D1 ∨ D2
...E ′1
Σ, D1,Σ ′   Ψ
...E ′2
Σ, D2,Σ ′   Ψ ∨L
Σ, D1 ∨ D2,Σ ′   Ψ cut
Σ,Σ ′   Ψ
Again, perform cut between D′ and E ′ , while the sub-derivation E ′ for j = i is dropped.i j
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contain any context separators:
...D′
Σ, D1   D2 ⊃R
Σ   D1 ⊃ D2
...E ′1
Σ   D1
...E ′2
Σ, D2,Σ ′   Ψ ⊃L
Σ, D1 ⊃ D2,Σ ′   Ψ cut
Σ,Σ ′   Ψ
This is solved by ﬁrst applying cut to E ′1 and D′ and then cut the result with E ′2:
...E ′1
Σ   D1
...D′
Σ, D1   D2 cut
Σ   D2
...E ′2
Σ, D2,Σ ′   Ψ cut
Σ,Σ ′   Ψ
Note that here the ﬁrst application of cut is at a smaller height but the second cut need not be in general. However, this
second cut is on a smaller cut proposition D2 compared to D1 ⊃ D2 of the original cut.
(D/∀R,E/∀L)
...D′
Σ R ∅   D ∀R
Σ   ∀R.D
...E ′
Σ,Γ R D,Σ ′′   Ψ ∀L
Σ,∀R.D,Γ R Σ ′′   Ψ cut
Σ,Γ R Σ ′′   Ψ
where Σ ′ = Γ R Σ ′′ . Using weakening (which happens to preserve tightness) this turns into
...D′ weakened
Σ,Γ R ∅   D
...E ′
Σ,Γ R D,Σ ′′   Ψ cut
Σ,Γ R Σ ′′   Ψ
(D/∃R,E/∃L) Since the cut proposition ∃R.D is always introduced by ∃L at the focus point we must have Σ ′ = Γ and
the cut looks like this:
...D′
Σ   ∅ R D ∃R
Σ   ∃R.D
...E ′
Σ R D  Ψ ∃L
Σ,∃R.D,Γ   Ψ
cut
Σ,Γ   Ψ
Due to Lemma 2(iii) we may assume that E ′ ends in Ax f and Ψ = Φ R Ψ1, i.e.,
...D′
Σ   ∅ R D ∃R
Σ   ∃R.D
...E ′′
Σ R D   Ψ1 Ax fΣ R D  Φ R Ψ1 ∃L
Σ,∃R.D,Γ   Φ R Ψ1 cut
Σ,Γ   Φ R Ψ1
at which point we need to make further distinctions according to the last rule of D′ . In fact, we show that every instance
of the following cut∗ is admissible and preserves tightness:
...D′
Σ   ∅ R D
...E ′′
Σ R D   Ψ1 cut∗
Σ   Φ R Ψ1
from which Σ,Γ   Φ R Ψ1 follows by weakening, Lemma 2(i).
(D′ right rules) The last rule of D′ cannot be any of the right rules ∧R , ∨R , ⊃R , ∀R , ∃R since these would not leave an
empty ﬁrst compartment ∅ in the succedent Σ   ∅ R D .
(D′ axioms) Obviously, the last rule of D′ can neither be Axm nor Ax f . If D′ ends in ⊥L we have ⊥ ∈ Σ and can get the
conclusion sequent Σ   ∅ R Ψ1 straight away, thereby implementing this instance of cut∗ .
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...D′′
Σ1,Ci,Σ2   ∅ R D ∧LiΣ1,C1 ∧ C2,Σ2   ∅ R D
...E ′
Σ1,C1 ∧ C2,Σ2 R D   Ψ1 cut∗
Σ1,C1 ∧ C2,Σ2   Φ R Ψ1
becomes
...D′′ weakened
Σ1,C1 ∧ C2,Ci,Σ2   ∅ R D
...E ′ weakened
Σ1,C1 ∧ C2,Ci,Σ2 R D   Ψ1 cut∗
Σ1,C1 ∧ C2,Ci,Σ2   Φ R Ψ1 ∧L
Σ1,C1 ∧ C2,Σ2   Φ R Ψ1
Tightness is not affected since the weakening only enlarges non-empty scopes. In a similar way we proceed with ∨L,
⊃L, ∀L. If the end rule is ∃L then we have
...D′′ normalised
Σ ′ R C   D Ax fΣ ′ R C  ∅ R D ∃L
Σ ′,∃R.C,Γ   ∅ R D
...E ′
Σ ′,∃R.C,Γ R D   Ψ1 cut∗
Σ ′,∃R.C,Γ   Φ R Ψ1
exploiting the normalisation property of derivations which links ∃L and Ax f . Now we weaken the sub-derivations and
recombine like this:
...D′′ weakened
Σ ′,Γ,∃R.C R C   D
...E ′ weakened
Σ ′,Γ,∃R.C R C, D   Ψ1 cut
Σ ′,Γ,∃R.C R C   Ψ1 Ax fΣ ′,Γ,∃R.C R C  Φ R Ψ1 ∃L
Σ ′,Γ,∃R.C   Φ R Ψ1
where cut is applied inductively to derivations D′′ and E ′ of strictly smaller height. Since weakening is done in the two last
scopes before the turnstile, tightness is preserved. 
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